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Abstract 
In the Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol, a Mobile Node (MN) is a mobile device with 
a permanent Home Address (HoA) on its home link. The MN will acquire a Care-of 
Address (CoA) when it roams into a foreign link. It then sends a Binding Update (BU) 
message to the Home Agent (HA) and the Correspondent Node (CN) to inform them of its 
current CoA so that future data packets destined for its HoA will be forwarded to the CoA. 
The BU message, however, is vulnerable to different types of security attacks such as: the 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, session hijacking attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attack. The current security protocols in MIPv6 are not able to effectively protect the BU 
message against these attacks. The Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) protocol is 
proposed in this thesis to overcome the shortcomings of some existing MIPv6 protocols. 
The proposed PKBU protocol incorporates: (a) a method to assert the address ownership of 
the MN by creating a 128-bit MIPv6 address based on the MN‘s private key, and computing 
one-way hash function in order to authenticate the MNs authority, thus, allowing the CN to 
validate that the MN is not a malicious node. The results obtained show that it addresses the 
security requirements as well as it able to check the address ownership of the MN; and (b) a 
method to verify the reachability of the MN by sending packets from the MN to the CN, 
directly, and through the HA. The CN will then use both packets to verify the reachability 
of the MN. The results show that the CN is able to correctly validate the HoA and the CoA, 
and also address the security requirements such as authentication, confidentiality and 
integrity. The PKBU protocol also offers protection for the MN against false binding-
update attacks, in which an attacker attempts to spoof two different messages, which are 
sent to the CN in two different paths. Thus, the PKBU protocol has addressed the important 
security requirements of mobile communication such as address ownership, reachability, 
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and device authentication. The PKBU protocol was subjected to formal security verification 
to identify any security flaws, by using the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL). The 
verification results show that the PKBU protocol meets all the security requirements and is 
able to successfully defend the BU message against common attacks. The INETMANET-
2.0 framework in the OMNeT++ network simulator was used to model the working of the 
PKBU protocol against common attacks and for attack detection, and attack mitigation. The 
results of the formal security verification and the network simulation modelling of the 
PKBU protocol show that the proposed protocol can improve the level of security in the 
MPv6 protocols, especially, the security of the BU messages transmitted between the MN 
and the CN. 
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Abstrak 
Di dalam protokol Mudah Alih IPv6 (MIPv6), sebuah Nod Bergerak (MN) adalah 
satu peranti yang mempunyai Alamat Rumah Tetap (HoA) pada pautan asalnya. MN akan 
memperoleh Care-of Address (CoA) apabila ia berkeliaran di dalam pautan asing.  
Kemudian ia akan menghantar mesej Kemaskini Ikatan (BU) kepada Ejen Rumah (HA) dan 
Nod Koresponden (CN) untuk memaklumkan tentang CoA semasa supaya paket seterusnya 
yang ditujukan kepada HoA akan disalurkan kepada CoA.  Namun begitu, mesej BU 
terdedah kepada pelbagai jenis serangan keselamatan seperti: serangan orang tengah 
(MITM), serangan rampasan sesi, serangan penafian servis (DoS).  Protokol keselamatan 
MIPv6 pada masa ini masih tidak dapat melindungi mesej BU dari serangan-serangan ini 
dengan berkesan. Protokol Kemaskini Ikatan Berasaskan Kunci Persendirian (PKBU) telah 
dicadangkan di dalam tesis ini untuk mengatasi kelemahan protokol MIPv6 sedia ada. 
Protokol PKBU yang dicadangkan menggabungkan: (a) kaedah untuk menegaskan 
pemilikan alamat MN dengan mewujudkan satu alamat 128-bit MIPv6 yang dihasilkan dari 
kunci persendirian MN, dan mengira fungsi cincang sehala untuk mengesahkan autoriti 
MN, sekali gus, membolehkan CN untuk mengesahkan bahawa MN bukan satu nod yang 
berniat jahat. Keputusan yang diperolehi menunjukkan bahawa ia dapat memenuhi 
keperluan keselamatan serta memeriksa pemilikan alamat MN; dan (b) kaedah untuk 
mengesahkan kebolehcapaian MN dengan menghantar paket dari MN kepada CN secara 
langsung, dan melalui HA. CN kemudian akan menggunakan kedua-dua paket untuk 
mengesahkan kebolehcapaian kepada MN. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa CN dapat 
mengesahkan HoA dan CoA, dan juga memenuhi keperluan keselamatan. Protokol PKBU 
juga menawarkan perlindungan kepada MN terhadap serangan kemaskini-ikatan palsu, di 
mana penyerang cuba untuk menipu dua mesej yang berbeza, yang dihantar kepada CN 
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melalui dua laluan yang berbeza iaitu secara terus dan melalui HA.  Oleh yang demikian, 
protokol PKBU telah menangani keperluan keselamatan penting dalam komunikasi mudah 
alih seperti pemilikan alamat, kebolehcapaian, dan pengesahan peranti. Protokol PKBU 
telah disahkan dengan menggunakan keselamatan formal untuk mengenal pasti apa-apa 
kelemahan keselamatan, iaitu dengan menggunakan Protokol Komposisi Logik (PCL). 
Keputusan pengesahan menunjukkan bahawa protokol PKBU memenuhi semua keperluan 
keselamatan, dan berjaya mempertahankan mesej BU terhadap serangan. Rangka kerja 
INETMANET-2.0 di dalam rangkaian simulator OMNeT++ telah digunakan untuk 
melaksanakan PKBU sebagai model terhadap serangan biasa, dan untuk mengesan 
serangan, dan juga untuk pengurangan serangan. Keputusan pengesahan keselamatan 
formal dan model simulasi rangkaian daripada protocol PKBU menunjukkan bahawa 
protokol yang dicadangkan itu boleh meningkatkan tahap keselamatan dalam protokol 
MIPv6, terutamanya, keselamatan mesej BU yang dihantar di antara MN dan CN. 
Pembangunan protokol PKBU oleh it telah berjaya menangani beberapa kelemahan 
keselamatan protokol rangkaian yang sedia ada. 
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 Over the last decade, the mobile Internet has been widely used by millions of people 
all over the world due to its availability. Mobile communication is now leading the way in 
today‘s Internet communications, and users expect to be able to roam the Interent from 
anywhere in the world through the different networks. The mobility support protocol for 
IPv4 (Mobile IP) [RFC 5944] (Perkins, 2010) dates back to 1993 when the first IPv4 
mobility support protocol was proposed.  In 1996, Mobile IPv4 was standardized as       
RFC 2002 (Johnson, Perkins, & Arkko, 1996), followed by the latest revision, RFC 3344 
(Perkins, 2002). The late 1990s witnessed the beginning of the Internet age, at which time 
the first pioneers began attempting to commercialize various Internet connectivity services. 
Companies and universities offered their services and information via the Internet. Shortly 
afterwards, individuals also started using the Internet for similar purposes. It has now 
become the largest global information network, and the Mobile IP plays a crucial role in 
keeping the network connected.  
 In a mobile Internet environment where mobile devices move frequently and get 
attached to other networks, they need to obtain new IP addresses to continue 
communicating with their correspondent nodes. As a result of the unpredictable growth in 
mobile Internet usage over the years, however, a larger address space is inevitably 
necessary as nearly all IPv4 addresses will be used up. In addition, network security is now 
an issue of concern with the ever increasing number of people using the mobile devices. 
The use of mobile devices were greatly affected by a wide range of attacks on the MIPv4 
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protocol, as it was not sufficiently secure to shield the nodes from the attacks. MIPv6 was 
developed to address the weaknesses of the IPv4 protocol.  
 MIPv6 uses a 128-bit address as opposed to IPv4 which uses a 32-bit address, and 
MIPv6 has other advantages, as well, such as auto-configuration and better security 
features. In the mobile Internet, IP routing is based on the information set up in the IP 
headers so that data can be sent correctly to the appropriate nodes. In this method, old IP 
links get destroyed and new links are constructed as the data is transmitted from one 
location to another. MIPv6 offers a way to mitigate this problem without the need to make 
major adjustments to the nodes or routers in a network. However, not all security and 
privacy issues in MIPv6 have been eliminated. Many of the MIPv6 protocols developed to 
overcome security vulnerabilities are defined in the standards and drafts of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). On December 1998, the IPv6 protocol was included in the 
RFC 2460 standard, and many of its features were incorporated into other standards, as 
well.  Table 1.1 shows a list of these standards. The MIPv6 standard remains as a draft or 
proposal form because of many unresolved issues. 
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Table ‎1.1: IPv6 and MIPv6 IETF RFC 
IPv6 and MIPv6 IETF RFCs Name 
Internet Protocol Version 6 RFC 2460 
Neighbour Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6) RFC 4861 
Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Auto-configuration in IPv6 RFC 4941 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for  the Internet Protocol 
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 
RFC 2463 
Recommendations for IPv6 in Third Generation  Partnership Project           
( 3GPP) Standards 
RFC 3314 
Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling between Mobile Nodes and 
Home Agents 
RFC 3776 
Mobility Support in IPv6 RFC 6275 
 
1.2 Operation of IP Mobility Protocol 
 IP mobility is a protocol for mobile networking and computing, and results from the 
convergence of the Internet and mobile communication technologies. IP mobility is 
designed to allow a Mobile Node (MN) to move from one network to another during 
communication, even though the MN's point of attachment to the network has physically 
changed (Perkins, 1997). When a mobile device is disconnected from the present network 
and gets reconnected to another network, portability is achieved. The MN achieves 
portability by having two IP addresses: 
 Home Address (HoA): a static IP address that resides in the home network. 
 Care-of Address (CoA): the MN‘s address in a foreign network. 
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 Whenever a Correspondent Node (CN) attempts to communicate with the MN 
located in a foreign network, it sends a packet to the Home Agent (HA). The HA will use IP 
encapsulation, whereby an outer header is added to the data packet along with the new 
address, and it then proceeds to tunnel the packet to the MN's CoA, at which point the 
packet will be encapsulated (Figure 1.1). This happened where in the IP Mobility, Binding 
Update (BU) message is sent from the MN to the HA and CN. Binding updates are a very 
important optimisation within Mobile IPv6, which allows the CN to bypass the HA router 
and communicate directly with the MN. BU message contains the Home Address (HoA) and 
Care-of Address (CoA) of MN.  
 
Internet 
CN
MN
(3) Tunnel
HA
Foreign Network
Foreign Network
Home Network
(1) Packets
(4) Packets
 
 
(2) The HA will use IP encapsulation  
to tunnel the packet to the MN’s CoA
 
Figure ‎1.1: Packet Routing in IP Mobility Protocol 
There are several security vulnerability issues with BU messages, and these include: 
data packet interception where an attacker is able to eavesdrop on the content, thus, causing 
a breach in confidentiality; modification of the transmitted packets to suit the malicious 
purpose of the attacker; Men-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks; session hijacking attacks; 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and Return to Home spoofing attacks (Soliman, 2004). In 
order for the attacks to happen, the attacker must know the IPv6 addresses of the MN‘s HoA 
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and the CN. The vulnerability to all these attacks clearly shows the weaknesses of the 
current Mobile IP architecture. It is very crucial that appropriate security measures must be 
taken to overcome or to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Further research on these weaknesses 
might even reveal that a single or common vulnerability could be the cause of many 
different attacks. 
 
1.3 Motivation 
The increasing use of mobile devices for communication, today, has raised great 
concern about the security of the data or information being transmitted. As discussed 
above, in the MIPv6 protocol, the BU message is vulnerable to a range of attacks. The 
research effort undertaken and reported in the thesis, was motivated by the need to protect 
the BU messages which are sent from the MN to the CN. The reasons for protecting BU 
messages are: 
 BU messages contain sensitive data such as the MN‟s HoA and CoA, and such 
information must not be revealed to potential attacks. 
 Many security measures introduced to protect BU messages, in the past, had various 
drawbacks because they could not conceal the location data from the attackers, i.e., 
they do not have location privacy feature (Yan, et al. 2012). 
 BU messages are used for redirecting addresses among the network nodes. 
Attackers exploit the security vulnerability of BU messages by intercepting the BU 
message and sending a false binding update message, instead, to the destination 
nodes. In a false binding update attack, the attacker sends a spoofed message 
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pretending to be a valid MN. It redirects the traffic that is intended for the original 
node into itself (Soliman, 2004). 
 Another type of attack that involves information theft is eavesdropping             
(Ying & Feng, 2010), which can either be active or passive. In active 
eavesdropping, the attacker will initiate an independent connection with the victim 
node and send messages to it. This will make the victim node believe that there is 
direct communication among the nodes using a private connection, but in actual 
fact, it is under the attacker‘s control. In passive eavesdropping, however, the 
attacker gets the needed information by gathering the session data that travels 
between the HA and its mobile device, by listening to the communication traffic. All 
messages that travel between the two nodes are intercepted, and new messages are 
inserted by the attacker. 
 Attackers can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack in the mobile network. This 
DoS attack prevents communication between the nodes by sending false BU 
message. This type of attack involves several security components such as 
authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. The largest amount of the victims‘ 
bandwidth is consumed during a DoS attack. This leads to overloading of 
computational resources at the victim's host location, causing loss of connectivity, 
and disruption of service to legitimate users. 
 In this research, the above issues were studied in more detail and a method is 
proposed to make the connection between the MN and the CN more secure, and in 
particular, to protect BU messages against Man-In-The-Middle attack, session hijacking 
attack, and Denial of Service attack.  
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1.4 Problem Statements 
The MIPv6 has a number of security vulnerabilities, particularly, the vulnerability 
of the BU message to various types of attacks. In the MIPv6, the MN needs to authenticate 
itself every time it moves to a foreign network. Without a secure authentication process, the 
data packets sent from one node to another node might be intercepted by a malicious node, 
causing the data packets to be redirected to its location or to an arbitrary IP address. This 
will deny service for the intended legitimate receiver node. This happens because current 
protocols do not have an effective authentication method to check the validity of the users, 
or to conceal the HoA and CoA of the MN (Georgiades, 2011). It is safe to conclude that 
most protocols such as Return Routability, Early Binding Update (EBU), Optimizing 
Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) and etc, (Chapter 3), face security vulnerabilities because they do 
not have an effective way of: 
 authenticating a user‘s identity, hence,  there is no way for the CN to know whether 
a MN is a valid node or a malicious one; 
 hiding the Care-of Address (CoA) in the current MIPv6 security protocols, hence,  
there is no way for the CN to validate the owner of the address, especially, CoAs 
with spoofed or modified address. 
In view of the weaknesses of the protocols, mentioned above, effective measures 
must be taken to provide a secure connection between the MN and the CN to protect the BU 
messages from common attacks on the MIPv6 protocol. These attacks include: Denial of 
Service attacks, where the attacker impersonates and denies services intended for the target 
node by directing network traffic to itself or another node (false node); Men-In-The-Middle 
attacks; and session hijacking attacks. 
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1.5 Research Aim 
Several security protocols have been introduced to overcome the vulnerabilities of 
the BU message to attacks, which could disrupt normal network operations or breach the 
confidentiality of users in the network. Most existing protocols, however, are not able to 
protect the BU message from the different types of attacks, effectively. The aim of this 
research is to develop a way to secure the BU message that is sent from MN to the CN.  
  
1.6 Research Objectives 
To produce the best security solution, the following objectives must be achieved: 
 To propose a method to assert the address ownership of the MN. This technique 
allows the CN to validate the MN to ensure that it is not a malicious node by 
checking the address ownership.  
 To propose a method to verify the reachability of the MN. This technique allows the 
CN to verify reachability of MN by checking CoA of MN. 
 To propose a method that is protecting the BU messages against MITM, session 
hijacking, and DoS attacks, and to ensure a secure connection between the MN and 
the CN.  
 To evaluate the security requirement of our proposed methods using Protocol 
Composition Logic (PCL) tool. 
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1.7 Research Scope 
In the MIPv6 network, any node is vulnerable to different types of security attacks. 
This research, however, focus on the security of the BU messages. This research design a 
framework based on the MN‘s private key to ensure a secure connection between the MN 
and the CN. To achieve the research objectives, the proposed protocol is evaluated using 
informal and formal security evaluation methods, and simulated in the INETMANET-2.0 
framework using the OMNeT++ simulator.  
 
1.8 Thesis Outlines 
This research work is structured as follows. Chapter 2, provides a background of the 
research, and this is followed by an overview of the MIPv6 protocol, the security threats to 
the BU message, analysis of security services and architectures for BU, authentication 
mechanisms, and the architecture of the MIPv6 protocol. The chapter also includes 
discussions of the cryptographic systems and the IPSec protocol.  
Chapter 3 presents a security analysis of existing binding update protocols. In this 
chapter, existing protocols used to safeguard BUs are reviewed with the aim of identifying 
their strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis in defending the BU message against various 
security threats. These protocols fall under two categories, namely, Infrastructure-less and 
Infrastructure-based protocols. Each of the existing protocols is explained with respect to 
their category. The chapter then focuses on all earlier protocols and highlight their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The proposed framework appears in Chapter 4. The solution to the security 
problems with respect to the BUs is identified after an extensive review of the literature. 
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This is further refined by taking into consideration input from existing works. This chapter 
initially provides an explanation of the requirements, assumptions, and principles of our 
proposed method. The components, operation and justification of the proposed security 
solution introduced are then explained. Chapter 4 also discusses the verification of the 
proposed system‘s security methods. The chapter concludes with the informal analysis as a 
way of validating our proposed solution. The analysis serves to examine the security 
requirements, ownership and reachability as well as the risks to the proposed protocol, as 
identified during the literature review. 
Chapter 5 elaborates on the formal security analysis performed on the protocol in 
Chapter 4. This examination was carried out as a rigid and methodological form of testing 
the precision of the proposed solution. In this respect, formal analysis was used, and the 
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) framework was selected (Cremers, 2008; Datta, Derek, 
Mitchell, & Roy, 2007; Durgin, Mitchell, & Pavlovic, 2001). Chapter 5 contains the design, 
implementation and results of the formal analysis of PKBU protocol simulation. The 
performance of the proposed protocol‘s was then evaluated. The INETMANET-2.0 
framework in OMNeT ++ simulation environment was used to carry out the simulation 
with the aim of verifying the ideas and concepts proposed in this thesis. Verification is 
based on how the proposed protocol reacts to various types of attacks, while observation is 
based on how successful is the protocol in preventing or mitigating attacks. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and recommendations for future work. It is also 
a brief introduction to the basic encryption methods used where a secure method was 
designed to protect BU messages sent between CN and MN.  
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1.9 Summary 
Binding Update (BU) is one of most important message in MIPv6. It contains 
information that the attacker can use them to attack the MNs or CNs. In order to protect the 
BU against these threats we need to find a secure way for authenticating the authority of the 
users, and at the same time, hide the data of the CoA. In addition, we need to find a secure 
technique for the CN to certify that the MN is valid and not a malicious node. In this 
research, we tried to establish a secure connection between the MNs and the CNs by 
protecting BU message which contains sensitive data. 
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Chapter 2 : THE MOBILE INTERNET PROTOCOL 
VERSION 6 (MOBILE IPV6) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter gives an insight into the current specifications of the MIPv6 protocol. 
Section 2.2 presents the basic operation of the MIPv6 protocol, and the three possible 
modes of communication between a Mobile Node (MN) and a Correspondent Node (CN). 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of the Binding Update (BU) messages in MIPv6, and 
details the security threats that could be launched against the protocol. It also presents the 
security services and performance requirements needed to overcome the attacks. Section 
2.4 gives an overview of the Return Routability (RR) procedure. It also identifies the 
security and performance limitations of the procedure against the requirements specified in 
Section 2.3. Section 2.5 presents the problem formulation. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises 
the chapter.  
 
2.2 Basic Operations in Mobile IPv6 
The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol is one of the most representative efforts being 
made toward achieving the next-generation all-IP networks. Unlike MIPv4, there is no 
foreign agent functionality in MIPv6 because a MN obtains a new IPv6 address within a 
foreign network by address auto-configuration (Belding, Elizabeth, Sun, & Perkins, 2001). 
The MN is a mobile device that has a Home Address (HoA) on its home link. The MIPv6 
protocol provides the Mobile Node (MN) with a unique, permanent identifier (IPv6 
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address) independently of the attached network. MIPv6 consists of three entities: the 
Mobile Node (MN), Home Agent (HA), and the Correspondent Node (CN), which is the 
peer that communicates with the MN. When a MN roams into a foreign link, it will acquire 
a new Care-of Address (CoA). The MN must register its current CoA with the HA. As a 
result, when the MN is located away from home, by using this binding method, the HA can 
intercept the message destined for the HoA and forward it to the binded CoA. This can be 
achieved by sending a Binding Update (BU) message in which the MN will initialise the 
home registration process. At the end, the HA will store the binding of the MN‟s HoA and 
the CoA in its cache (Johnson, Perkins, & Arkko, 1996; Robert, 2003). 
MN and the CN can communicate in three ways. All traffic between the MN and the 
CN will be routed by the HoA using the standard IPv6 routing mechanism without any 
special procedures, whenever the MN is at its home link (Deering & Hinden, 2006). 
However, when the MN is at a foreign link, there are three possible communication modes:  
1. Bi-directional tunnelling  
2. Triangle routing 
3. Route Optimization (RO) 
In the Bi-directional tunnelling mode, all traffic is routed indirectly to the MN‟s 
home link. This means that all CN‟s packets destined to the MN are routed to the home link 
of the MN, and are intercepted by the HA before they are forwarded to the MN‟s CoA via a 
tunnel. Similarly, packets sent from the MN to the CN are tunnelled to the HA          
(―reverse tunnelling‖). The packets will then be routed back normally to the CN from the 
home link. Usually, the IPv6 encapsulation method is used to perform the tunnelling 
between the HAs and MNs (Conta & Deering, 1998). Figure 2.1 shows the Bi-directional 
tunnelling mode. 
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Figure ‎2.1: Bi-directional Tunnelling: (a) Traffic from CN to MN  
(b) Traffic from MN to CN 
 
In the Triangle routing mode, a MN is able to send packets directly to the CNs. 
Figure 2.2 shows how the MN is able to deliver packets directly to the CN. However, the 
CN delivers packets to the MN's home address (HoA), and the HA routes them to the MN. 
The weakness of this type of routing is that the packet travels a longer path from the CN to 
the MN, when compared to the use of the direct path (Zuleger, 2005). Route Optimization 
(RO) is standard procedure in MIPv6 to eliminate inefficient triangle routing. RO routes 
packets between the MN and the CN using the shortest possible path (Anari & Mehdizadeh, 
2008; Nikander, Arkko, Aura, & Montenegro, 2003; Ren et al., 2006). 
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Figure ‎2.2: Triangle Routing Packet Transmission  
 
In Route Optimisation (RO) mode, the CNs deal directly with the MNs because they 
are allowed to skip the HA router. This method is shown in Figure 2.3. The MN must 
register its current location with the CN. As a result, a binding cache will be created and 
stored in the CN. It contains the binding information between the MN‟s HoA and the CoA. 
As such, all packets sent to the MN from the CN will be sent directly to the CoA rather than 
through the HoA. On the other hand, the HA holds the current addresses of the MNs and 
will send packets to the MNs whenever a CN does not know the address and sends it to the 
HA. However, the speed of delivery increases if the HA is bypassed using the BU route 
optimisation method. In the RO mode, a presumably shorter path is used between the MN 
and the CN, thus, the traffic volume at the HA as well as the home link is minimised     
(Ren et al., 2006).  
The security for RO that handles the BUs, however, is still a major security concern 
because attackers can use the BU to launch attacks such as MITM attacks, session hijacking 
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attacks and DoS attacks (See Section 2.3.1). A few solutions have been proposed to make 
RO secure. One of the solutions is the Return Routability (RR) security protocol based on 
RFC 3775 and adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (See Section 2.4). 
However, RR has a number of security vulnerabilities related to the BU messages (See 
Section 2.3.1).   
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This section segment continues by discussing the BU message which is one of the 
most important messages in Mobile IP, and its vulnerability to various malicious attacks     
(Ying, & Feng, 2010). 
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2.3 Binding Updates and its Security Threats in Mobile IPv6 
The MIPv6 protocol allows a MN to maintain its network connection during 
attachment transfers (Johnson, Perkins, & Arkko, 2004). A MN may be reached at its Home 
Address (HoA) anytime, including instances when the home network is not at the main 
physical location - in which case, the MN receives a Care-of Address (CoA) from the local 
router through stateless or stateful auto-configuration. Home registration subsequently takes 
place when the MN forwards its current CoA in a Binding Update (BU) message to its 
associated HA. The HA then redirects and tunnels the packets directly to the MN‘s CoA.  If 
there is no binding between the CN and the MN, meaning that registration is in progress, or 
MIPv6 is not supported by the CN, then, bidirectional tunnelling can be used. In this case, 
an HA acts as a medium through which a foreign location MN communicates with a CN (a 
stationary or mobile peer communicating with a MN). 
For MIPv6 to run properly, it is important to protect the BUs. Various security 
loopholes and weaknesses exist in the connections between the nodes. These weaknesses 
could result in data packet interceptions, thus, allowing malicious attackers to eavesdrop on 
the content. This could also result in breach of user privacy and modification of data 
packets. Other weaknesses include address spoofing, redirection, and Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks (Aura, 2004; Aura, Roe, & Arkko, 2002; Deng, Zhou, & Bao, 2002; Ehmke 
et al., 2009; Georgiades, 2011; Mankin et al., 2001; Nikander et al., 2003; Nikander et al. 
2005; Sudanthi, 2003). The section below will describe the security risks and attacks, 
followed by Section 2.3.2, which will discuss the security services to prevent such attacks, 
as well as the performance requirements for such security services. 
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2.3.1 Security and Attacks in Binding Update 
In order to design a protocol that can mitigate or avoid the associated security risks, 
it is crucial to identify all possible threats to the protocol. Many attacks that exploit 
weakness in the MIPv6's binding features, cause inappropriate bindings to happen. For 
example, the MN's location may be misinformed by other entities such as the HA and the 
CN, and as a result, the intended traffic is directed to the wrong destination, instead of the 
MN. A brief description of such attacks is given, below (Nikander et al., 2005; Perkins, 
Johnson, & Arkko, 2011): 
 
 Malicious MNs flooding attacks 
In malicious MN flooding attacks, the HA and/or the CN receives a spoofed message 
from the attacker. The spoofed message contains the HoA of the fake MN‘s own HoA along 
with the CoA of the victim‘s address. It falsely claims that it has shifted to the victim‘s 
node. The HA and the CN would then proceed to send all packets that are meant for the MN 
to the victim‘s address, flooding the victim‘s node with redundant data. Figure 2.4 shows 
an example of such attack (Soliman, 2004).  
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Figure ‎2.4: Malicious MNs Flooding Attacks 
 
 Session hijacking attacks 
In the session hijacking attack, illustrated in Figure 2.5, it is assumed that MN1 is 
communicating with the CN. A false BU message is sent (or an old BU message is 
replayed) to the CN, claiming that the MN1 has moved to a new CoA that belongs to MN2 
(the HoA is set to the HoA of a victim MN, and the CoA is set to the attacker's address 
(MN2)). If the CN accepts this false binding update message, it will begin to communicate 
with MN2 instead of MN1. Such an attack may result in information leakage, MN 
impersonation, or MN2 flooding. 
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Figure ‎2.5: Session Hijacking Attacks 
 
  Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks 
In a DoS type attack, the assailant uses a BU message to stop any service from 
being transmitted from the CN to the MN‟s CoA. A false binding update message may be 
sent requesting a CN to forward packets meant for the MN to a fake address that is not the 
real MN‟s CoA. By using such a spoofed BU, an attacker can cause a large amount of 
unwanted traffic to overwhelm the resources of a single node or network. Initially, the 
attacker locates a website with streaming video or a different heavy data stream, and 
connects to it. It then sends a BU to the CN requesting traffic redirection to the attackers‘ 
new location (Figure 2.6). This node will, therefore, be bombarded constantly with 
unwanted traffic. Attackers may also use a target network‘s prefix to pass on a spoofed BU 
message, thus, redirecting a great deal of streaming traffic to the intended network and 
flooding it with unwanted data (Ren et al., 2006).  
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Figure ‎2.6: Denial-of-Service Attacks 
 
  Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks 
In Man-In-The-Middle attacks, the MN and the CN receive spoofed BUs from the 
attacker, and thus, deem the attacker as the middleman between the MN and the CN  
(Figure 2.7). When the attacker is located on the path between the MN and the CN, it can 
modify the BU message, potentially hijack ongoing connections or create a reflection attack 
between the MN and the CN (Elshakankiry, 2010; Soliman, 2004). 
22 
 
MN
Attacker
CN
   Existing Traffic     
(2
) F
al
se
 B
in
di
ng
 U
pd
at
e 
T
hi
s i
s “
A
”,
 I 
am
 a
t “
C
”
(4
) S
ub
se
qu
en
t T
ra
ff
ic
 
M
ea
nt
 fo
r 
“A
”
(1) F
alse B
inding U
pdate 
T
his is “B
”, I am
 at “C
”
(3) Subsequent T
raffic 
M
eant for “B
”
(1), (2) Attacker sends a spoofed BU message to MN and CN.
(3) MN sends packets to the attacker instead of CN.
(4) CN sends packets to the attacker instead of MN.
Entity A Entity B
Entity C
 
Figure ‎2.7: Man-In-The-Middle Attack 
 
 Return-to-home spoofing attacks 
In return-to-home spoofing attacks, an attacker will pretend to be a MN that is away 
from its home link. It will communicate with a CN and send a spoofed BU which contains 
the HoA of a victim‘s MN, while the attacker‘s address is set as the CoA. Figure 2.8 shows 
the attacker requesting heavy data download e.g, video streaming, from the CN. Another 
spoofed BU is sent to the CN, informing it that the attacker has returned to its home link. 
As a result, the CN will continuously direct data traffic to the victim node, eventually 
flooding the node with excessive amount of unwanted data (Elshakankiry, 2010; Johnson et 
al., 2004; Nikander et al., 2005; Ren et al., 2006; Soliman, 2004). 
23 
 
( 2
)
MN      CN
   Existing Traffic     
(1
)
(4) Flooding the victim
 with excessive 
unwanted data
Victim
(3
)
(1) False Binding Update (HoA of “D”,CoA of “C”)
(2) Starts to download a heavy stream of data
(3) Spoofed BU to remove its Binding Cache entry at the CN.
(4) Flooding D with unwanted data.
Attacker
Entity A Entity B Entity D
Entity C
 
Figure ‎2.8: Return-to-home Spoofing Attack 
 
 Replaying Binding Updates 
In this type of attack, an attacker replays a recently authenticated BU to the CN. 
Here, the CN will redirect data packets to the MN‟s previous location. Similar to spoofed 
BUs, replay attacks can be used to capture data packets or initiate DoS attacks. An attacker 
can impersonate a MN by capturing the data packets if it succeeds in obtaining the MN's 
previous address after it has moved away from the network. The attacker would then 
redirect the packets to the former location by replaying the previous BUs. In addition, the 
attacker can block the BU of the MN new location, for example, by using a radio jammer or 
by initiating a flooding attack. Following that, the attacker would use the old location to 
take over the mobile connection. Any packets forwarded to the MN will also be captured by 
the attacker. This process would continue until the entry of the correspondent's Binding 
cache expires.  
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In summary, all BU exchanges between a MN and its HA, as well as between a MN 
and its CNs, must be protected. When security is not adequate, attacks such as DoS attacks, 
MITM attacks, and session hijacking are possible. Data secrecy and integrity can be 
safeguarded with the use of strong encryption and integrity protection techniques. 
However, DoS attacks may still occur with spoofed BUs even if the data had been 
cryptographically protected, but this would not result in any disclosure or corruption of 
sensitive data in the traffic flow. The two nodes can also refuse any BU from another node 
to protect the communication path (Aura & Arkko, 2002; Nikander et al., 2005). The next 
section discusses the security services for overcoming the above-mentioned attacks. 
 
2.3.2 Security Services 
In order to address the security risks and attacks discussed above, the following 
security services should be provided. Many security requirements have been suggested by 
Stoneburner (2001), Riedel (2003), Elshakankiry (2010), Georgiades (2011). 
 
 Authentication 
The process of verifying the identity of a user or a device for the purpose of 
communication is called the authentication process. Authentication provides security 
assurance to all BU messages coming from nodes with original HAs and CoAs. 
Authenticating the CoA ensures that the entity is indeed located at that address. Today, a 
variety of authentication schemes  are available, such as the Kerberos(Neuman, Yu, 
Hartman, & Raeburn, 2005; Yu & Astrand, 2012),  X.509 standard (Cooper et al., 2008), 
and Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) trust model (Perlman, 1999). Most of these, however, 
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refer to a central, Infrastructure-based authentication database for user verification (Eronen 
& Arkko, 2006). An Infrastructure-less or decentralised authentication system may provide 
much better security for a Mobile IP. However, the drawback is that a large amount of 
resources is consumed, or possible exposure of vital address data can lead to attacks. 
Commonality of features in crucial in producing an ideal solution, and the relevant details 
can be obtained by understanding all the fundamental components of the many different 
types of authentication systems. The commonality features include the components for 
hashing (Arkko, Nikander, & Montenegro, 2002), digital signatures (Tanenbaum & Van 
Steen, 2003), address-based keys (Kempf, Gentry, & Silverberg, 2002), and 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)  (Aura, 2005). 
Other authentication systems such as IPSec (Arkko, Devarapalli, & Dupont, 2004), 
and AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) have also been investigated 
(Rigney, Willens, Livingston, Merit, & Simpson, 2000) (Appendix B). From the analysis of 
these, authentication systems, it has highlighted the importance of implementing a good 
security architecture. An additional consideration concerns the resources needed to run 
these architectures beyond what is required by the mobile devices. 
 
 Integrity 
The integrity of the data is another important security cousideration when dealing 
with attacks and other security risks. This service ensures that any BU messages sent out 
will contain the same binding data upon arrival. The hash algorithm is adopted to ensure 
data integrity. By default, the Mobile IP provides support for the MD5 (Message-Digest) 
algorithm (RFC 1321) - an algorithm that can be used for integrity verification and secret-
key authentication (Rivest, 1992). Currently, an IPSec security association is applied 
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between the HA and the MN as a form of integrity protection with BUs and 
acknowledgement authentication (Kroeselberg, Patil, Tschofenig, & Korhonen, 2012). The 
Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) (Kent, 2005b) header must be supported by both the 
MNs and the HA. It must be used during the transport mode and feature a non-null payload 
authentication algorithm (Kent, 2005a).  
 
 Confidentiality 
Any data passing through the Internet can be intercepted and be falsified. With the 
BUs, some security breaches could potentially happen. These breaches include data packet 
interception, resulting in an intruder eavesdropping on the content being transmitted, thus, 
violating a user‘s confidentiality; or the modification of transmitted packets for malicious 
purposes.  
 
2.3.3 Cryptography 
Communication between nodes is kept secret through cryptography even if third-
party interception occurs. Mathematical algorithms that scramble the data serve this 
purpose. Data with the relevant information is placed into strings by the algorithm for the 
purpose of data encryption. In cryptography, the transmitted data is scrambled into a 
message with packets undecipherable by the attacker. Only the parties possessing the 
relevant keys have the ability to decrypt the message. 
There are two types of algorithm in cryptography: symmetric, and asymmetric 
algorithms (Appendix A). In symmetric algorithms, the encryption and decryption 
processes use the same key. It is easy to implement cryptography, but the difficulty is in 
maintaining data security and secrecy during data exchange. Many security solutions such 
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as the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and the traditional RSA public key, use cryptography to 
provide security for BU messages (Xiao, 2003). The Diffie-Hellman algorithm 
communicates using a key (Boyko, MacKenzie, & Patel, 2000). A major drawback, 
however, is that the Diffie-Hellman algorithm cannot determine the validity of the keys sent 
by the sender or the receiver (Werapun & Unakul, 2004).  
Asymmetric cryptography helps in mitigating the problems encountered with the 
symmetric algorithm. In the asymmetric algorithms, two keys are used - a private key and a 
public key. The private key is only available to the owner, while the public key is available 
to everyone. This type of algorithm runs complex mathematical formulas with 
exponentiation and large prime numbers (Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978). In order for 
someone to send a message to another person, he must first obtain the receiver‘s public key 
to encrypt the message. The encrypted message is then forwarded to the recipient where it 
has to be decrypted with the recipient‘s private key to obtain the plaintext. Traditional 
public key cryptography is applied in the RSA method. This security model is popular in 
various types of networks, including MIPv6. The model, however, consumes a large 
amount of bandwidth because of the recommended RSA key length of 1024 bits to improve 
security. The security levels of an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based system with a 
160-bit prime order is similar to the 1024-bit modulus p DSA model, as well as the 1024-
bit modulus n RSA model (Boneh & Franklin, 2003; Menezes, 1993). In this research, the 
Elliptic Curve Cryptographic system (Miller, 1986) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) (Werapun, & Unakul, 2004) (Appendix A) are adopted to develop the 
protocol to provide protection for the BU messages as they have same security level with 
less number of bit compare other algorithm. 
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2.4 Return Routability 
Return Routability (RR) is a security protocol based on RFC 3775 and adopted by 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RR protocol is used to conduct HoA and 
CoA checks. Such checks are necessary for a node to confirm the presence of another node 
that answers to the packets traveling to a certain address (Hasan & Hassan 2013). A positive 
reply confirms the existence of a node at the given address (Figure 2.9). Return routability 
checks include message pairs such as (Home Test, BU) and (Care-of Test, BU). To activate 
the test packets, Home Test Init (HoTI) and Care-of Test Init (CoTI) are needed, while the 
BU message plays the role of a combined routability response for both tests (Johnson et al., 
2004; Perkins et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2006).  
MN HA
(4) Home Test 
(HoT)
CN
(3) Care-of Test Init (CoTI)
(6) Care-of Test (CoT)
(7) Binding Update (BU)
(5) Home Test 
(HoT)
 (8) Binding Acknowledgment (BA)
(1) Home Test Init 
(HoTI)
(2) Home Test Init 
(HoTI)
 
Figure ‎2.9: Return Routability Protocol 
 
 
29 
 
Home Test Init 
The CN will receive a Home Test Init (HoTI) message from the MN requesting the 
Home Keygen token through the HA. The message content can be summarised and 
presented accordingly: 
 Source Address =  home address 
 Destination Address =  correspondent address 
 Parameters:  home init cookie 
The CN receives the HoTI message which contains the HA of the MN. The CN also 
receives the Home Init Cookie from the MN which it needs to reply later on. 
The reverse tunnelled process is done to the HoTI message via the HA. The values of 
the cookies are ‗remembered‘ by the MN thus giving it the assurance that the CN is 
processing the protocol messages. 
 
Care-of Test Init 
The CN will receive a Care-of Test Init (CoTI) message from the MN requesting the 
Care-of Keygen token directly, without going through the HA. The message content can be 
summarised and presented accordingly: 
 Source Address =  care-of address 
 Destination Address =  correspondent address 
 Parameters:  care-of init cookie 
The CN receives the CoTI message which contains the CoA of the MN. The Care-of 
Init cookie is also sent along by the MN which must be returned by the CN.  The CN 
receives the CoTI Message directly from the MN. 
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Home Test 
To reply the Home Test (HoT) message, the HoTI message is sent back through the 
HA. The message contains: 
 Source Address =  correspondent address 
 Destination Address =  home address 
 Parameters:  home init cookie 
    home keygen token 
    home nonce index 
Once the HoTI message has been received by the CN, the Home Keygen token is 
generated with the following information: 
 
home keygen token := First (64, HMAC_SHA1 (Kcn, (home address | nonce | 0))) 
 
Where | represents concatenation. The last ‗0‘ of the HMAC_SHA1 functions 
represents the single zero octets used to differentiate the Home cookies and the Care-of 
cookies. And the first 64-bit of the MAC is used to construct the Home Keygen token. This 
Home Keygen token ensures that the messages sent to the MN‟s HA can be received. In 
order for the CN to verify the Home and Care-of nonces that it generated, the production of 
the Home Keygen token will use Kcn. It is used so that the CN won‘t be forced to recall the 
list of all token that has been handed out. 
The home network is used by the MN to send the HoT message. It is presumed that 
the message will be tunnelled by the HA to the MN. This means that the BU should already 
be sent to the HA by the MN in order for the HA to receive and authorised the MN‟s CoA 
just before the RR procedure.  
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The home init cookie of the MN is returned via the HoT message. It is used to 
ensure that the message actually comes from a node on the route existing between the CN 
and the HA.  
The MN receives the home nonce index which allows the CN to find the nonce value 
used to create the home keygen token more efficiently. 
 
   Care-of Test 
The reply to the Care-of test (CoT) message is sent directly to the MN and not 
through the HA. This message contains the following: 
 Source Address =  correspondent address 
 Destination Address =  care-of address 
 Parameters:   care-of init cookie 
    care-of keygen token 
    care-of nonce index 
Once the CoTI message arrives at the CN, the Care-of Keygen token is generate 
with the following details: 
care-of keygen token :=  First (64, HMAC_SHA1 (Kcn, (care-of address | nonce | 1))) 
 
The final ‗1‘ inside the HMAC_SHA1 represents a single octet which contains the 
hex value of 0x01. This value will be used to discern the home cookie and care-of cookie 
from each other. This token is created using the first 64-bit of the MAC and is sent as the 
CoA to the MN. And to ensure that the message actually comes from the node on the route 
the CN, the Care-of Init message from the CoTI message is sent back. 
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In order to identify the nonce used for the Care-of Keygen token, the Care-of nonce 
is used. The indices of the Home and Care-of nonces may be similar or it may be different 
to the Home and Care-of Test messages. 
The RR procedure is complete once the HoT and CoT messages are received by the 
MN. Now the MN has the necessary data to send a BU to the CN. A 20 octet binding key 
Kbm is generated from the hashed token by the mobile node. It contains the following 
details: 
Kbm = SHA1 (home keygen token | care-of keygen token) 
 
Until the CN receives the BU from the MN, it will not create any state specific for 
that MN. The binding management key (Kbm) is not maintained by the CN and is created 
only when a new nonce indices along with the MN address has been given. Once the Kbm 
has been created by the MN, the verifiable BU can now be sent to the CN.  
 
Binding Update 
The binding management key (Kbm) is created by the MN using the keygen tokens 
mentioned in the previous section. This is done in order to authorise a BU. The BU content 
has the following details: 
 Source Address =  care-of address 
 Destination Address =  correspondent address 
 Parameters:    home address (within the Home Address destination 
option if different from the Source Address) 
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sequence number (within the Binding Update 
message header) 
    home nonce index (within the Nonce Indices option) 
 care-of nonce index (within the Nonce Indices 
option) 
 First (96, HMAC_SHA1 (Kbm, (care-of address | 
correspondent | BU))) 
The nonce indices option is contained in the BU. It indicates which home and care-
of nonces can be use by the CN to recomputed the Kbm. Once the MAC has been verified by 
the CN, the Binding Cache entry can now be created for the MN. 
 
Binding Acknowledgement 
In certain cases, the BU is acknowledge and accepted by the CN. The message of 
the content is as shown below: 
 Source Address =  correspondent address 
 Destination Address = care-of address 
 Parameters:   sequence number (within the Binding Update 
message header) 
 First (96, HMAC_SHA1 (Kbm, (care-of address 
|correspondent | BA))) 
The Binding Acknowledgement (BA) and BU contain the same sequence number. 
The source address field of the IPv6 contains the value of the BU and is normally used for 
the CoA for the binding procedure. However, an Alternate CoA mobility option in the BU 
may be included to create a different CoA.  If such message was received by the CN and the 
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authorisation method used was the RR procedure, the CoTI message and the Care-of 
message must be performed according to the address in the alternate CoA option and not the 
source address. The information gathered in this test must be used for the nonce indices and 
MAC value. 
 
 Security Analyse of Return Routability  
In the RR protocol, the two token exchanges confirm that the MN is active at its 
corresponding HoA and CoA. The MN activity at both the HoA and the CoA is important. 
The RR protocol security is also important because it clearly depends on the MN secretly 
sharing Kbm with CN, which is, in turn, is dependent on, at least, the secrecy of one token. 
The RR protocol security, however, is particularly fragile because anyone with access to the 
CoT and the HoT messages can obtain the tokens. Although the RR protocol was originally 
designed with sufficient Mobile IP support in mind, and with the hope that it would not 
incur new major security problems, protection against attacks, even prior to the introduction 
of IP mobility protocols, was somewhat overlooked (Aura, 2004; Johnson et al., 2004; 
Nikander et al., 2003). The protocol does not defend against intruders observing the CN–HA 
path because such intruders would be able to actively attack an MN at its home location, 
anytime (Deng et al., 2002). Attacks on MIPv6 are usually easier to carry out than attacks on 
IPv6. For example, for an intruder to carry out a false binding update attack, he should 
always be on the CN-HA path on a base IPv6 without mobility (equivalent to an MN at its 
home link in MIPv6). To redirect the CN traffic to attach the MN to a malicious node, the 
intruder must gain control of a router or a switch on the CN–HA path. If the malicious node 
(disguised as an MN) wishes to continue its session with the CN after taking over the session 
from the MN, it must continue to collaborate with the router. In such a case, the router would 
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tunnel the CN traffic to the malicious node, and vice versa. Another example, assume that 
the MN1 and the CN are communicating and the intruder wishes to redirect the CN traffic to 
his associated MN2  ( Figure 2.10). In this case, the intruder would monitor the CN–HA path 
(i.e., anywhere from the MN1‘s home network to the CN‘s network) to obtain the HoT, after 
which it would extract the Home token and send it to MN2. When the MN2 receives the 
Home token, it would forward a CoTI to the CN, and the CN would reply with a Care-of 
token (CC). The MN2 can then hash the two cookies for a valid session key to use to send a 
BU message to the CN on behalf of the MN1. The CN would accept the BU, and the CN 
would finally direct data traffic to MN2. 
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Figure ‎2.10: Break the RR Protocol by Attacker 
 
A DoS attack is a good example of an attack in a base IPv6 without mobility, where 
many compromised systems attack one target. A malicious MN flooding attack on MIPv6 
can be carried out in many ways on a node or network. For example, a MN could begin 
communicating intensively with the CNs and shift to the victim‘s network or its exterior 
boundary. The malicious node would then send BU messages via the RR protocol to 
redirect traffic from the CNs to the victim‘s network. No special software or network setup 
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is needed for this attack, thus, making it easy for an intruder to disrupt the operations 
through the RR protocol. In another scenario, if a CN offers on-line services to many 
mobile clients, an intruder could effortlessly eavesdrop on the RR protocol messages and 
gather cookies from its location between the CN and the Internet. The intruder could then 
redirect the traffic to any mobile client by randomly hashing the cookie pairs to create 
session keys, and deliver the BU messages to the CN. The result would be detrimental to 
the CN‘s services. 
The Early Binding Updates protocol (EBU) was developed with the aim of 
improving the RR protocol (Vogt, Bless, Doll, & Kuefner, 2005). This protocol is used to 
send message fractions prior to handover. Both protocols, however, have similar security 
architectures, and this makes the EBU to be prone to the same types of attacks, mentioned 
above. The Dual Identity Return Routability protocol  may be used to enhance the RR by 
having a second identity in the same device (Georgiades, Luo, Lasebae, & Comley, 2006). 
The second identity helps to transport half of the security tokens required to generate a BU 
key. It sends data to both identities, each of which has their own HA, and the MN 
amalgamates them to generate the key. In this method, the MN needs two separate IP 
addresses, as a single address will not make it efficient enough. 
 
2.5 Problem Formulation 
Binding updates (BUs) have several security weaknesses such as: data packet 
interception which infringes on the user‘s confidentiality as attackers eavesdrop on packet 
content; and modification of transmitted packets to suit the attackers‘ malicious aims. On the 
other hand, Mobile IP security vulnerabilities include address spoofing, denial of service 
attacks, and data traffic redirection.  
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Certain protocols like IPSec and RR are specifically designed to improve BU 
security. With IPSec, BU messages are protected between the HA and its MNs, while RR 
relies on securing the communication path between the CN and the MN. However, both 
protocols have similar security vulnerabilities, as mentioned in the Section 2.3. Based on our 
review of the researches on BU security, many protocols have been developed to address the 
issue. These protocols include: Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) (Aura, 2005); 
Early Binding Update (EBU) (Vogt et al., 2005); Purpose-Built Key (PBK)               
(Mankin, Bradner, & Schiller, 2003); CAM-Child-Proof Authentication (Lowe, 1997); 
Unauthenticated Diffe-Hellman-based Binding Update (Le & Faccin, 2001); Enhanced 
Route Optimization (Arkko, Haddad, & Vogt, 2007); Certificate-based Binding Update 
(Deng et al., 2002); shared key (Dupont & Combes, 2006; Perkins, 2006); Ticket-based          
( Koo, Koo, & Lee, 2006) and the BAKE/2 protocol (Roe et al., 2002). Their main aim is to 
defend BU messages against eavesdropping, modification, and DOS attacks. These protocols 
can be classified into Infrastructure-less, and Infrastructure-based protocols. The earlier 
security solutions will be reviewed in the next chapter.  
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2.6 Summary 
This chapter presents an overview of the MIPv6 protocol. Using the security feature 
found in MIPv6, the potential attacks and security threats were identified along with 
security services and requirements needed to minimise such problems. The chapter also 
discusses Return Routability (RR), the standard framework for ensuring security in IP 
communication. 
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Chapter 3 :  ANALYSIS OF BINDING UPDATE 
PROTOCOLS IN MOBILE IPV6 
3.1 Introduction 
The main aim of protecting BU message in the MIPv6 protocol is to ensure a secure 
connection between the MN and the CN. This chapter presents the existing protocols that are 
used to protect Binding Update (BU) messages, and it also highlights the strengths and 
weaknesses of these protocols vis-a-vis the security threats to BU message and the security 
services to address the threat, covered in Chapter 2. In the rest of this chapter, each existing 
protocol under the Infrastructure-less and Infrastructure-based categories will be reviewed. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates this categorisation of the protocols. Before discussing the existing 
protocols, we will present briefly the cryptographically-generated IPv6 addresses (See 
Section 3.2) as they are essential elements of some of the Infrastructure-less protocols. 
Section 3.3 discusses the Infrastructure-less protocols, while Section 3.4 discusses the 
Infrastructure-based protocol. Section 3.5 is the chapter summary.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.1: Protocols under Infrastructure-less and Infrastructure-based Categories 
 
3.2 Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) 
The Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) is an essential element of some 
of the Infrastructure-less protocols. It includes the IPv6 address – a 64-bit address generated 
by hashing the address owner's public key (Aura, 2005). CGA-based authentication 
techniques that are used to protect the IP-layer signalling protocols include the neighbour 
discovery and mobility protocols. The CGA is based on the  RFC 3972 standard for securing 
the neighbour discovery protocol (Bos, Özen, & Hubaux, 2009; Tuomas, 2005). To 
authenticate that a message originates from a specific CGA address, the address owner signs 
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the message with his private key. The message, the public key, and the signature from the 
CGA address, are then sent to the verifier. The verifier uses the public key to verify the 
signature on the message. If the signature is valid, the verifier is assured that the message 
was sent by the owner of the specific address.  
In those techniques that use the CGA, the public key used for authentication is 
already provided in the IPv6 addresses. Thus, there is no necessity to use trusted third parties 
of PKI to prove that the IPv6 address belongs to the owner of the public key. However, this 
CGA-based method has several weaknesses (Cao, Deng, Ma, & Hu, 2007): (i) there is no 
guarantee that the owner is reachable at the stated address, for example, a malicious hacker 
can simply use a cryptographically-generated non-used address of its own public key 
together with the victim‘s network as its own subnet prefix; (ii) even though it can 
effectively prevent impersonation of a valid IPv6 address by any attackers, it cannot prevent 
attacks on the entire network via data redirection to illegal  address; (iii) there are limitations 
in the technique, in view of the heavy reliance on the computer to perform signature key 
calculations and verification of public-key operations, particularly, the digital signatures; 
this could lead to denial-of-service attacks, especially on devices that have lower 
computation power such as mobile devices, or when the participant has to perform 
simultaneous digital signature verification for a large number of peers; (iv) the public key 
and the signature of the address owner are carried by a messenger for generating an address 
cryptographically, thus, consuming a certain amount of bandwidth. The procedure for 
generating an IPv6 address using CGA is illustrated in Figure 3.2 (Bos, Özen, & Hubaux, 
2009). 
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 Figure ‎3.2: Data flow of the Address Generation in Cryptography Generated 
Address(Bos, et al., 2009) 
 
1. Set the modifier to a random 128-bit value. Select the security parameter Sec and 
the collision count to zero. 
2. Concatenate the modifier, 64+8 zero bits, and the encoded public key. Execute the 
H algorithm on the concatenation. The leftmost 112 bits of the result are Hash2. 
3. Compare the 16*Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 with zero. If they are all zero (or if 
Sec=0), continue with Step (4). Otherwise, increment the modifier and go back to 
Step (2). 
43 
 
4. Concatenate the modifier, subnet prefix, collision count and encoded public 
key.Execute the H algorithm on the concatenation. The leftmost 64 bits of the result 
are Hash1. 
5. Form an interface identifier by setting both reserved bits u and g in Hash1 to 1 and 
the three leftmost bits to Sec. 
6. Concatenate the subnet prefix and interface identifier to form a 128-bit IPv6 
address. 
7. If an address collision with another node within the same subnet is detected, 
increment the collision count and go back to step (4). However, after three 
collisions stop and report the error. 
Address ownership verification is accomplished by executing the following steps 
given the IPv6 address, collision count and the modifier (Bos, et al., 2009): 
1. Check that the collision count is 0, 1 or 2 and that the subnet prefix is equal to the 
subnet prefix of the address. CGA verification fails if either check fails. 
2. Concatenate the modifier, subnet prefix, collision count and the public-key. 
Execute the H algorithm on the concatenation. The 64 leftmost bits of the result are 
Hash1. 
3. Compare Hash1 with the interface identifier of the address. The differences in the 
two reserved bits u and g and in the three leftmost bits are ignored. If the 64-bit 
values differ (other than in the five ignored bits) then CGA verification fails. 
4. Concatenate the modifier 64 + 8 zero bits and the public key. Execute the H 
algorithm on the concatenation. The leftmost 112 bits of the result are Hash2. 
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Read the security parameter Sec from the three leftmost bits of the address‘ interface 
identifier. Compare the 16*Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 with zero. If any one of these bits is 
not zero, CGA verification fails; otherwise verification succeeds. If Sec = 0 verification 
never fails at this step. 
These weaknesses could be overcome by combining the CGA, RR and 
authentication verification methods to create a security solution - the Distributed 
Authentication Protocol (Georgiades, Luo, Lasebae, & Comley, 2006). In this proposed 
technique, however, the MNs require more processing power, thus, rendering the mobile 
devices to be less efficient (Rossi, et al. 2012). CGA can also be combined with the 
Optimizing Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) protocol to produce CGA-OPMIPv6, a new protocol 
which will be discussed in Section 3.3.6. 
 
3.3 Infrastructure-less Binding Update Protocols 
In the Infrastructure-less Binding Update protocols, the MNs and the CNs belong to 
different administrative domains. These types of protocols are widely applied, and are for 
general usage on the Internet. The Infrastructure-less protocols are used across the world 
because they allow authentication between the MNs and the CNs without the need for any 
security infrastructure. 
 
3.3.1 Early Binding Update (EBU) Protocol 
Early Binding Update (EBU) was proposed by Vogt et al. in 2005 to enhance the 
RR procedure, as discussed in Chapter 2. EBU reduces the long registration delay caused 
by the RR, by shifting the order of the HoA and the CoA tests. The HoA test is executed 
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prior to handover, while the MN uses the old CoA. After handover, the CoA test is carried 
out in parallel with data transfer. EBU uses the Credit-Based Authorisation technique        
(Vogt, 2005; Vogt et al., 2005) to limit the amount of data that a CN sends to the MN and 
its unconfirmed CoA, and it runs the CoA test concurrently. Figure 3.3 shows the exchange 
of messages between the nodes in the EBU protocol (Modares, et al.2013). 
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Figure ‎3.3: Early Binding Update (EBU) Protocol (Elshakankiry, 2010) 
 
EBU enhances the RR and reduces the correspondent registration delay. However, 
one to two additional messages are needed, and if the MN needs to run the HoA test 
periodically, the signalling overhead increases. Implementing Credit-Based Authorisation 
in the CN raises complexity and  EBU will still be vulnerable to attacks applicable to the 
RR (Elshakankiry, 2010). 
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3.3.2 Purpose-Built Key (PBK) Protocol 
The Purpose-Built Key (PBK) protocol was developed to authenticate and verify the 
network communication initiator (Mankin, Bradner, & Schiller, 2003). Here, the data 
packets must arrive continuously from the same source in order for the protocol to run, but 
the initiator identity is not crucial. As such, the protocol is suitable in confirming that a CN 
has to acknowledge that the correspondent‘s registration details originate from the MN that 
started the communication. During the registration of any correspondent, the PBK protocol 
needs four messages.   
Compared to the RR procedure, this method, in fact, reduces the signalling 
overhead. Registration delay, however, remains because of the 1.5 round-trip between the 
MN and the CN. Also, there is higher vulnerability to DoS attacks, leading to an 
overconsumption of resources because the process requires verification of two-digital 
signatures during protocol execution. An additional weakness is its vulnerability to MITM 
attacks in the initialisation process. The hash key or public key can be intercepted during 
the initialisation process if an attacker listens in on the transmission path, and then 
transmits a different key. In the PBK protocol, the authentication of the CoA is based on the 
address reachability test, but it does not authenticate the HoA (Elshakankiry, 2010). 
 
3.3.3 Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6 (CAM) 
CAM is a security system that authenticates the BUs in MIPv6                         
(O'shea & Roe, 2001). It functions by incorporating a one-way hash function of its public 
key into the MN‘s chosen HA. Demonstrating knowledge of the corresponding private key 
validates the address ownership. Therefore, if a key pair must correspond to the hash 
function, it is difficult to falsify (Bidan, 2013). A CAM node creates a key pair which is 
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stored locally upon initialization, after which a HA has to be chosen. A 64-bit routing prefix 
is obtained by listening for the local router advertisements. In most cases, the interface ID is 
obtained from the media access control address (MAC address) because it is economical, 
and globally unique. However, the CAM protocol alone cannot ensure node reliability, thus, 
other protocols are needed to compensate for this deficiency. Moreover, in a situation where 
an attacker jams a mobile‘s BU but delivers a binding acknowledgement that cuts the MN 
off from the HA and the correspondent, the protection alternatives would be IPSec or some 
variants of CAM (Lowe, 1997). The advantage of CAM is that it reduces both the signalling 
overhead and the registration delays. In CAM protocol, only one message is required 
between the MN and the CN. It checks the authenticity of the HoA by using the CGA-based 
address and the reachability test. However, a drawback is that the protocol will then be 
open to MN flooding attacks because it is unable to verify the authenticity of the CoA. The 
CAM protocol can detect any replay BUs using time stamps. In addition, both the MN and 
the CN must possess a synchronised clock, and this gives rise to the same security problem 
as for the CGA-based technique, mentioned above. 
 
3.3.4 Unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman-based Binding Up- date (UDHBU) 
Protocol 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is used in the Unauthenticated Diffie-
Hellman Binding Update (UDHBU) protocol (Le & Faccin, 2001). It provides a session 
key that is shared by the MN and the CN. The two nodes will use this session key for 
authentication during correspondent registration. The UDHBU protocol is applied at the 
start of correspondent registration, as well as at subsequent registrations. It requires four 
messages in the first registration, but only two for the subsequent correspondent 
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registrations. This reduces delays because only a one-way registration is necessary for 
subsequent correspondences between the MN and the CN. Moreover, the CN only performs 
two exponential calculations in the initial registration phase. The protocol also allows the 
long-term use of the shared key between the MN and the CN because redundant message 
signalling is reduced – usually, due to the RR procedure, which constantly generates new 
shared keys.  
 
The UDHBU protocol is particularly prone to flooding attacks at the MN due to its 
inability to authenticate the CoA. MITM attacks and false binding update attacks can also 
adversely affect this protocol because of the unauthenticated DH key. For example, an 
attacker might plant itself on the path and intercept the DH public value, and relay its own 
version during the first correspondent registration. It is also possible for the attacker, 
instead of a legitimate MN, to initialise the protocol. If this happens, the attacker has an 
opportunity to capture the session key, and subsequently use it to transmit false binding 
updates. 
 
3.3.5 Optimize Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) Protocol 
The combination of the RR method with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol 
(Diffie & Hellman, 1976) produces the Optimize Mobile IPv6 (OMIPv6) protocol   
(Haddad & Krishnan, 2004). The two techniques combine to produce a shared key for the 
sessions between the MN and the CN via a similar process to the above mentioned UDHBU 
protocol. OMIPv6 was developed with the aim of including the initial registration phase 
with the subsequent registration of the correspondents. Its course begins in the initialisation 
phase of the correspondent registration. Both the MN and the CN will execute the RR 
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protocol to generate a shared secret key. The two nodes will then exchange the DH key that 
has been verified by the shared secret key during the previous RR process, for long-term 
shared key session. OMIPv6 uses exactly the same subsequent correspondent registration as 
that used by the UDHBU protocol. It takes eight messages and 2.5 round trips between the 
MN and the CN for OMIPv6 to register the correspondent. Subsequent registrations only 
require one-way trips between the MN and the CN and two messages. This protocol, 
therefore, gives better protection against DoS attacks compared to that provided by 
UDHBU. Generally, both OMIPv6 and UDHBU share similar features and have their 
advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages include: an attacker is able to intercept 
the DH public value; and OMIPv6 is prone to MITM attacks due to its inability to 
authenticate the CoA. 
 
3.3.6 CGAs - Optimize Mobile IPv6 (CGA-OMIPv6) Protocol 
The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol is a combination of the CGA-based techniques and the 
RR procedure (Haddad, Dupont, Madour, & Arkko, 2005). The optimisation steps of the 
MIPv6 protocol are as follows: (1) Public/private keys are self-generated by the MN; (2) the 
HoA is configured by the MN according to the CGA concept, described in Section 3.2; (3) 
the MN exchanges CoTI and CoT messages with the CN to obtain the CoA reachability 
proof when a new CoA is requested; (4) following the initial correspondent registration 
with the CN, the MN provides the reachability proof along with HoA ownership. These 
steps are carried out by signing the first BU message with its own private key, after which 
the public key is sent with the signed message. The proof can be obtained during the 
exchange between the CoTI and the CoT.  
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The CGA-OMIPv6 protocol has two phases: the initial registration of a 
correspondent and the subsequent registration. In the initial correspondent registration 
phase, the CN authenticates the MN‘s HoA along with the reachability of the MN‘s HoA and 
the CoA. These two nodes can communicate by exchanging secret session keys. Subsequent 
registration takes place when there is a new CoA at the CN that needs to be registered by 
the MN. The CN can verify the MN‘s reachability at the new CoA. Five messages are sent 
during the initial phase of the correspondent registration, and four messages are sent during 
the subsequent registration are passed to the CGA-OMIPv6 protocol. The correspondent 
registration, between the MN and the CN requires 1.5 round trips. When a new CoA is 
claimed, a CoA reachability test is performed to ensure partial protection against DoS 
attacks on third parties. The CN will use RR to establish the KBM, which is used to verify 
BU message authenticity before any CGA-based address verification algorithm is run. In 
the initial correspondent registration phase, both the MN and the CN are also required to 
carry out two public key operations.  
 
3.3.7 Enhanced Route Optimization for Mobile IPv6 (ERO-MIPv6) 
Protocol 
The functions of EBU and CGA-OMIPv6 ( See Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.6) are 
combined to produce the ERO-MIPv6 protocol (Arkko et al., 2007). The protocol uses both 
CGA and address reachability to authenticate the HoA. In this protocol, six messages are 
sent during the first correspondent registration, and four messages are sent in the 
subsequent registration. For any correspondent registration, the delay time between the MN 
and the CN has been optimised to a one-way route by this protocol. In addition to the delay 
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time optimisation function, this protocol has the same advantages and disadvantages as 
CGA-OMIPv6, as elaborated in Section 3.3.6. The implementation of the Credit-based 
Authorisation technique in the CN is becoming increasingly complex, as in EBU 
(Elshakankiry, 2010). 
 
3.3.8 CAM-DH Protocol 
CGA provides a basis for CAM-DH to secure the BUs (Roe et al., 2002).  CAM-DH 
contains a digital signature system in which every MN possesses a public key and a private 
key pair, PMN and SMN. The MN‟s HoA is CGA generated from PMN. CGA presents CAM-
DH with a way to bind the MN‟s PMN to its IPv6 addresses. However, CAM-DH has some 
limitations, one of which is that CAM-DH does not authenticate the CoA. Furthermore, an 
attacker intercepting packets meant for the CoA can run the protocol and become the source 
of CoA data overload, even if the real CoA owner-host does not wish to partake in the 
protocol. An alternative to CoA authentication is to develop the CoA and the HoA using the 
node‘s public key. This may not succeed, however, if the subnet enforces constraints on the 
CoA.  Also, CGA generation involves high amount of computation. The CAM-DH protocol 
requires large processing power to handle asymmetric cryptography and CGA and it is 
vulnerable to the problems of scalability and flexibility as well as spoofing, and replies 
attacks. Moreover, the MN incurs a high computation load for each BU message that needs a 
signature to be produced by the MN, in addition to signature validation by the CN (Kavitha, 
et al. 2010). 
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3.4 Infrastructure-Based Binding Update Protocols 
Infrastructure-based Binding Update protocols generally require support from some 
security infrastructure in order to provide protection for the BU. This type of protocol 
provides assurance to the CN that the MN's HoA is valid and correct, which means that the 
MN's HoA is related to the secret key or the public key of the private/public pair. Hence, it is 
not necessary to test the HoA, leading to reduce delays during registration, and less overhead 
in signalling. 
3.4.1 Public-Key based Protocols 
3.4.1.1 Certificate-based Binding Update (CBU) Protocol  
A CBU protocol was proposed to provide secure connection in MIPv6               
(Deng et al., 2002; Feng, et al., 2005). The CBU protocol authenticates a MN and its HoA 
using a certificate. However, the CBU does not address the HoA certificate management 
concerns. It is built around disjointed authentication infrastructures existing within individual or 
various domains. The Certificate Authority (CA) provides each home link subnet prefix with 
a certificate, and this is not very practical. Flexibility is clearly another issue in this flat-
structured trust management, hence, it is impossible to implement it across domains with 
various infrastructures on a global scale. The CN is not responsible for tracking complex 
individual subnet prefix changes of the home links. To minimize and better manage these 
shortcomings, a divide-and-conquer tactic is recommended. Another disadvantage of the 
CBU protocol is that the CN cannot ensure that the MN is live on its claimed CoA in the BU 
message. Fake BUs within a MN‟s CoA, can be transmitted by malicious nodes disguised as 
MNs, could be potential intense attacks (Kavitha, et al. 2010). 
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3.4.1.2 Hierarchical Certificate-based Binding Update (HCBU) Protocol 
The HCBU protocol (Ren et al., 2006) provides additional improvements to CBU in 
that it asserts the MN's ownership of a claimed CoA. The signature of a foreign link is 
obtained with the binding of the HoA and the CoA whenever the MN roams to a foreign link 
with a newly-configured CoA. The HA‟s role covers not only all home-linked MNs but other 
roaming MNs from different links, all of which are the nodes in their home links. The home 
link proves to the CN that both the HoA and the CoA are owned by the MNs. All claimed 
CoAs are authenticated, resulting in added security and protection against malicious MN 
flooding attacks on third party nodes. In addition, a trusted third-party or foreign link is 
required to verify the CoAs of the MNs. This service is available if an authentication 
infrastructure is established. The role of the HA then becomes more complex because it also 
covers the roaming MNs from other links. Another matter to note is that foreign HAs are 
needed to assist in computing the roaming MN's signature, and this would reduce the foreign 
network throughput. The HCBU protocol has pre-handover phase which will increases the 
signalling overhead (Yeh, Lo-Yao, et al. 2013). 
 
3.4.2 Secret-Key based Protocols 
3.4.2.1 Shared Key Protocol 
The Shared key protocol (Dupont & Combes, 2006; Perkins, 2006)  is used for 
authenticating the BUs between a MN and a CN where both nodes share a symmetric key. A 
CN randomly generates a number (a nonce) at regular intervals, then uses the same key to 
nonce all MNs it communicates with. The node, therefore, does not have to generate or store 
new ones for fresh mobile communication. The Correspondents can differentiate between 
the nonces because their values have a subscript, and if „+1‟ is added; the values can be 
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verified and compared with the previous messages. CNs store current and old nonces, but 
can dispose of older values, while messages with old nonces are abandoned as replays. The 
keys can maintain fixed values or get repeatedly updated. Updating both a key and a nonce 
can be done simultaneously, in which case, the subscript would signify the key and the 
nonce, together. The Shared key protocol requires only two messages, and this reduces 
signalling overhead when compared to the RR procedure. However, the Share key protocol 
is unable to authenticate the claimed CoA, and it is vulnerable to flooding attacks by 
malicious MNs. The MN is required to store different confidential information of each CN, 
and in turn, the CN is required to do the same for each MN. In order to protect itself against 
replay attacks, the CN has to keep track of the latest value of sequence numbers in the BU 
message sent from the MN. If the value received from the MN is not properly maintained by 
the CN, then the chances of it being fooled into accepting a replay BU message is very high 
(Suresh, et al. 2013).  
 
3.4.2.2 Ticket-based Binding Update (TBU) Protocol 
In the TBU protocol (Koo, Koo, & Lee, 2006), communication between the MN and 
the CN is protected using the IPSec ESP tunnel. Other requirements include extending the 
HA‟s role to verify the MN's HoA validity, establishing a ticket as well as a secret key 
between the MN and the CN, and providing a mutual authentication system for both nodes.  
The TBU protocol is divided into two parts: the initial correspondent registration, 
and the subsequent registration. Only two messages going one-way are required by the 
TBU protocol for subsequent correspondent registration between the MN and the CN. In 
this way, both signalling overhead and registration delay are reduced to a minimum. 
Security is further enhanced because HoA ownership is ensured. For example, return-to-
55 
 
home spoofing attacks are greatly reduced, and this too causes a reduction in redundant 
signalling messages of frequently-generated shared keys during the RR procedure, as both 
the MN and the CN are provided with a long-term secret key and a ticket. During the initial 
registration of the correspondents, the TBU protocol requires four messages and one-way 
communication between the MN and the CN. A one-way time between the CN and the HA 
is included. The TBU protocol, the MN, HA and CN clock must be fully synchronised as it 
relies on timestamps to recognise replay messages. In the TBU, there is greater complexity 
of the MN correspondent registration at the HA, nevertheless, this protocol is still open to 
MN flooding attacks due to its inability to authenticate the requesting CoAs                          
( Koo & Lee, 2007). 
 
3.4.2.3 Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAK-based) 
Binding Update Protocol 
For the BU protocol based on PAK (Yoon, Kim, Hong, & Youm, 2006), both the 
MN and the CN are required to share the same password. The MN and the CN can 
authenticate each other using an optimised PAK scheme, allowing future correspondent 
registration one-time binding of the established management key, as well as authenticating 
the validity of the MN‟s HoA. In the PAK-based BU protocol, four messages are exchanged 
between the MN and the CN during the correspondent registration (Lee et al. 2013). The 
optimised PAK scheme is in the first two messages, whereas, the Diffie-Hellman based 
password authentication key exchange scheme is used by both the MN and the CN                      
(Boyko et al., 2000). The remaining two messages are the standard BU and BA messages 
that are protected by the PAK scheme‘s optimised key. Four messages are needed by the 
PAK-based BU protocol, as well as about 1.5 round trips. Verification of the MN‟s 
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reachability at the CoA is carried out as protection against malicious flooding attacks on the 
MN, and other third parties. Security is further strengthened as the HA ownership is 
verified, and because the password is set according to the MN's HoA. However, both the 
MN and the CN must each store different passwords. The two nodes must also compute two 
different exponential calculations for every correspondent registration. 
 
3.4.2.4 BAKE/2 Protocol 
The BAKE/2 protocol (Roe et al., 2002)  facilitates the dynamic establishment of a 
shared secret key by expanding the shared key protocol. BAKE/2 is appropriate for 
communication between nodes which have been secured against eavesdropping, or secured 
by IPSec - something not offered by this protocol. A weakness of BAKE/2 is that it can be 
breached by attacks somewhere between the HA and the CN (Gunderson, 2008). The 
protocol does not offer protection against an attacker who can monitor the HA to CN route. 
However, it can protect the CN against denial of service attacks. This conserves resources 
as there is no need for large amount of processing power to authenticate the messages. This 
protocol facilitates communication between a MN and a non-mobile server, but may not be 
suitable for communication with a mobile server. This protocol provides protection against 
DoS attacks, in which the attacker uses the victim‘s CoA to redirect high bandwidth traffic 
to it.  
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter highlights several existing protocols used to protect BU messages in 
MIPv6. The protocols are divided into two different categories: Infrastructure-less and 
Infrastructure-based protocols. A comparison of these two categories shows that the 
Infrastructure-less protocols are more secure than the Infrastructure-based protocols due to 
centralised nature of the information. This is a big disadvantage and not secure, if a third-
party directory has been successfully breached, then all the node information is available to 
the attackers. As a result, we decided to work on Infrastructure-less protocols and to protect 
BU between MN and CN. Moreover, in the review of previous works, the security threats, 
and the need to authenticate the HoA and CoA have highlighted as a vulnerability of the BU 
messages.  
In general, the results of the analyses indicate that the protocol for BU 
authentication should be based on the fact that the location information in IPv6 must be 
authenticated. The MNs should authenticate themselves every time they move to foreign 
networks. In the absence of a proper authentication process, the packet flow from one node 
to another might be intercepted by a malicious node that could redirect the flow to its own 
location or to another IP address. As a consequence, service meant for the intended 
legitimate receiver will be denied. These security problems arise because the current 
protocols do not have effective authentication methods to verify the user‘s validity or 
conceal the HoA and the CoA location data. These weaknesses would, inevitably, make the 
protocol vulnerable to malicious attacks. Hence, the main objectives of this study are to 
propose a method that is able to authenticate the HoA and the CoA by checking address 
ownership and the reachability of the MN, and to overcome the vulnerabilities of earlier 
protocols in protecting the BU message against the MITM attacks, session hijacking 
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attacks, and DoS attacks, and making the connection between the MN and the CN secure. 
The next chapter presents our proposed protocol for securing the BU message as it is 
transmitted between the MN and the CN. It will also present the framework of the PKBU 
protocol, and evaluate the ownership and reachability methods to check the correctness of 
the MN‘s IP addresses.  
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Chapter 4 : PRIVATE KEY-BASED BINDING UPDATE 
(PKBU) PROTOCOL 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) protocol 
which provided the motivation for the proposed method to assert the address ownership of 
the MN, and also to verify the reachability of the MN. The PKBU protocol offers protection 
against false binding update attacks, in which an attacker attempts to spoof two different 
messages, which are sent to the CN from two different paths. The PKBU protocol 
requirement will be explained in Section 4.2, while the protocol design concepts will be 
outlined in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4. Section 4.5 will discuss the PKBU protocol, in 
detail. Evaluation of the proposed methods will be presented in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Proposed Protocol’s Requirement 
The main aim of developing the proposed protocol is to check the ownership and 
reachability of MN‟s HoA and CoA. The proposed protocol must fulfill the following 
security requirements: 
 assure the CN that the BU request comes from an entity that actually owns the HoA 
by verifying the authenticity of the claimed HoA; 
 assure the CN that the entity that sent the BU message is located at the CoA by 
verifying the authenticity of the claimed CoA. 
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 detect any unauthorised modification of the binding data, thus, improving the 
integrity of the binding request. 
 ensure that the BU message is protected against session hijacking, MITM attacks, 
and DOS attacks. 
 ensure that the number, and the length of the messages sent to or received from the 
MN is kept to the minimum. 
There must also be less dependence on third-party nodes for the proposed protocol 
to carry out its functions. 
Hash functions should be included in the binding update protocol as part of data 
integrity checks. Also, to ensure that the node is in the location it claims to be, there should 
be a method of verifying the location authenticity. A sound, while complementary solution 
can be produced with the combination of a cryptographic system, digital signature, hash 
function, and IP address creation based on the private and public key of the user. 
 
4.3 Proposed Protocol’s Assumptions 
The design of the protocol was based on several assumptions: 
 The Bi-directional security association for the communication that is encrypted and 
authenticated is preconfigured at the MN and its HA. The IPSec ESP protocol is 
used as a method for protecting the mobility-related message that is exchanged 
between the MN and the HA. 
 The validity period is agreed between the MN and its HA, and the HA will reject any 
mobility-related message that arrives after the validity period.  
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 One trusted entity is the MN's HA, and both the MN and the CN believe that the HA 
will behave itself if left on its own. 
 The HA is aware that the CoA belongs to the MN because it has been registered with 
the HA by the MN. 
 
4.4 Proposed Protocol’s Principles 
In the design of our proposed protocol, the following measures have been taken in 
order to fulfill all the security requirements stated in Section 4.2, above: 
Measure 1:  Both the MN and CN use the PKBU protocol. The MN uses it to 
register a new CoA whenever it roams away from its original home link, while the 
CN uses it to verify that the CoA belongs to the MN.  
Measure 2:  The PKBU assures that the address of the user actually belongs to the 
actual user and is not a spoofed address. It also prevents spoofing by authenticating 
the location of the communicating device and ensuring that the IP address is correct. 
The CN receives a hash of the authentication data from the MN through the HA. The 
data is stored as hash by the HA, and cannot be read by attackers who might try to 
intercept it during transmission. The MN will sign the cipher text and send it to the 
CN. The CN can verify that it is using the MN's public key and decipher the text 
using the CN‘s private key. The CN then proceeds with calculating the hash of the 
text, and if they match, then the authentication process is successful. 
Measure 3:  By using the PKBU, the centralised authority will be removed and a 
decentralised authentication system is used, instead. The HA, which is maintained 
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and managed by the Internet Service Provider (ISP), stores the security data of the 
MN such as its HoA and CoA.  
 
4.5 Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) Protocol 
Our proposed method asserts the address ownership of the MN by creating a 128-bit 
MIPv6 address based on the MN‘s private key and computing one-way hash function to 
provide a way to authenticate the MNs authority. This technique allows the CN to validate 
the MN and ensure that it is not a malicious node by checking the address ownership. The 
PKI is not needed anymore with this binding ownership of the MN‘s HoA. The MN 
retrieves its private and public key pair, while the user's ID is used to obtain the node's 
private and public key pairs. In the proposed method of checking the ownership of MN‘s IP 
address, the HoA of the MN is certified using the secure interface ID. It is based on the 
MN's private key and a valid subnet prefix. 
The second method proposed in PKBU involves verification of the reachability of 
the MN. In this method, the hash value of the MN's HoA, the public key of MN, and request 
for the CN‟s public key are sent from the MN to the CN through the HA. After the MN 
receives the CN‟s public key, it will send another message directly to the CN. In this 
message, the MN encrypts the MN‟s CoA and HoA using the CN‟s public key. The 
encrypted message will be signed with the MN‟s private key. When the CN receives these 
messages from the MN, the CN uses the MN‟s public key to verify the signature, then the 
CN decrypts the message to obtain the MN‟s CoA and HoA.  The CN then calculates the 
hash value of HoA and compares it with the hash value from the message received from the 
MN via the HA. If one of the signature verification, decryption or comparison of hash value 
processes produces a negative result, the message will be rejected. If the results of the 
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checking and the validation process are positive, the CN is assured that the MN's HoA and 
CoA are correct and that the MN can be reached at this CoA. This method will be described 
in detail. 
 
4.5.1 Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) Protocol’s Phases 
Figure 4.1 shows the three phases involved in the exchange of messages between 
the nodes in the PKBU protocol. Phase 1 consists of three steps in our proposed method to 
assert the ownership of the MN‘s IP address. In phase 2, we describe our proposed method 
to check the reachability of MN. Phase 3 consists of four steps pertaining to the validation 
process. It is important to note that the MN assures the ownership and reachability of both 
HoA and CoA to the CN using the validation process. 
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Figure ‎4.1: Message Exchanged between the MN, CN and HA 
 Phase 1: 
This phase consists of the three steps involved in generating the MN‘s private and 
public keys, and creating the MN‘s interface ID.  
o First Step (Create Private Key): 
In this step, the MN creates its own private key, which can be acquired depending 
on the user ID (Figure 4.2). To obtain the private key, a hash functions Hash (User ID) * i 
is used, where ‗i‘ is a random integer in the range [1, n-1]. If the private key of user‘s MN 
is an integer, MNPRK, then: 
MNPRK = Hash (User ID) * i 
65 
 
The private key is a number based on the user ID hash value and random number, 
meaning that it cannot be predicted, and it is, thus, secure. 
 
User‟s ID
Random Number (i)
MN’s Private Key = Hash (User ID) * i 
 
Figure ‎4.2: Generating the Private Key in PKBU 
 
o Second Step (Create Public Key): 
In this step, the MN creates its public key. This protocol uses Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) for creating the public key. The sender uses the receiver‘s public key 
to encrypt the message, then, signs it using its private key. The receiver then decrypts the 
ciphered message using its own private key and uses the sender‘s public key for 
verification. Thus, one of ECC advantages over other asymmetric algorithms is that it 
offers the same level of security, but uses smaller size keys. ECC implementation is also 
much more efficient as it consumes less power and computes faster. Less memory and 
bandwidth are required due to the shorter bit length of the key (De Dormale, Bulens, & 
Quisquater, 2004). Such attributes are particularly attractive in security applications with 
restricted computation power and integrated circuit space (Modares, Salem, Salleh, & 
Shahgoli, 2010). ECC is a public key cryptography, and every user or device involved in 
the communication normally has a pair of keys - a public key, and a private key - as well as 
a set of operations associated with the keys for performing cryptographic operations. 
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Therefore, only the legitimate or valid user knows the private key, while all other users in 
the communication receive the public key. ECC mathematical processes are characterized 
by the elliptic curve y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b, where 4a
3
 + 27b
2
 ≠ 0. Each „a‟ and „b‟ value 
produces a different elliptic curve, and all points (x, y) that satisfy the above equation, 
including a point at infinity, lie on the elliptic curve. The public key is a point on the curve 
obtained by multiplying the private key with the generator point G in the curve. The ECC 
parameters are T = {a, b, G, n}, where ‗a‘ and ‗b‘ are parameters of the elliptic curve E: y2 
= x
3
 + ax + b, „G‟ is the base point on the curve and ‗n‘ is the elliptic curve order. If the 
private key of MN is an integer MNPRK, then MN‘s public key (MNPUK) is ‗MNPRK.G‘, 
which is also a point on ‗E‘ (Appendix A). Hence, a public key is a point on the curve 
generated from a private key (Figure 4.3). Thus, the MN has its own public and private 
keys which will be used to check the ownership of the IP address of the MN. 
 
 
MNPUK = MNPRK.G 
 
Figure ‎4.3: Creating Public Key for PKBU 
 
o Third Step (Create Interface ID): 
In this sub step, the MN creates the final 128-bit IPv6 address. The IPv6 has a     
128-bit address, together with a given 64-bit subnet prefix and a 64-bit interface identifier, 
derived from a MN‟s private key hash value. This new method creates a solid cryptographic 
binding between the MN‟s interface identifier and the MN owning the private key. The 
binding proves MN ownership of HoA without a PKI (Figure 4.4).  
G is the base point 
on the Elliptic Curve 
MN‟s private Key MN‟s Public Key 
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Figure ‎4.4: 128 bits IP Address (Subnet Prefix, Interface ID) 
 
 Phase 2: 
 The MN sends the CoA to the HA via IPSec. Every time a MN enters a new 
network, it will be configured with a new CoA. The MN then must register its new CoA and 
other operations with its HA before the new CoA can be used (Johnson et al., 2004).  
 
o First Step (Send Message 1): 
 Message 1 will be sent through the HA all the requirements for routing optimisation 
to the CN. These include the MN's HoA hash value, and the public key of the MN, obtained 
in the first phase. The MN will also request for the CN's public key (ReqCNPUK). The 
message contains the CN's address to indicate the first destination of the message       
(Figure 4.5).  
 
 
 Source: MN(CoA)Destination: HA  Hash (MN (HoA)), MNPUK, ReqCNPUK  
(It is sent to the HA via a pre-established secure tunnel of IPv6) 
Subnet Prefix Interface ID 
128 bits 
The final IPv6 address is a 
128-bit address with a 
given 64-bit subnet prefix 
and a 64-bit interface 
identifier, which is derived 
from a hash of the private 
key of the MN. 
 
 
64 bits 64 bits 
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 Source: HA  Destination: CN Hash (MN (HoA)), MNPUK, ReqCNPUK 
o Second Step (Send Message 2): 
 In Message 2, BU message preparation is completed and the CN sends its own 
public key to the MN through the HA, and the CN stores the hash value of the MN‟s HoA 
and MN‟s public key. 
 
 Source: CN Destination: HA (CNPUK) (MN receives CNPUK from the HA, and 
prepares message 3, which has the BU). 
 
 Source: HA Destination: MN (CNPUK) 
 
o Third Step (Send Message 3): 
 In Message 3, the MN encrypts the MN‟s CoA and HoA using the CN‟s public key 
(the one sent by the CN to the MN via the HA). The encrypted message will be signed with 
the MN‟s private key.  
 
 Source: MN(CoA) Destination: CN  
SignMN(PRK) (EncCN(PUK)( MN(CoA), MN (HoA))) 
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MN HA
 (1) Hash (MNHoA), MNPUK, ReqCNPUK
 (2) CNPUK 
(3) SignMN(PRK) (EncCN(PUK)( MN(CoA), MN (HoA)))
CN
 (2) CNPUK 
(1) Hash (MNHoA), MNPUK, ReqCNPUK
(4)Binding Acknowledgement 
 
Figure ‎4.5: Message Exchange in Phase two of PKBU 
 Phase 3: 
This phase consists of four steps, and is used to evaluate the security requirements, 
ownership, and reachability of the MN‘s IP addresses (Figure 4.6).  
o First Step (Authentication): 
To authenticate the MN‟s signature ‗Sign (MNPRK)‘, the CN will use the MN‟s 
public key. If the message is not signed by the MN‘s private key (MNPRK), then the CN will 
not be able to verify it and the process will end. But if the CN can verify the MN‘s 
signature, it means that the MN is authenticated. The CN then checks the confidentiality of 
the message via the second step (Figure 4.6). 
o Second Step (Confidentiality): 
In this step, the CN will use its own private key to decrypt the message. After 
decryption, the CN can obtain the MN‟s CoA and HoA. If the CN is be able to decrypt the 
message using its own private key that means the data of the MN‟s CoA and HoA were 
secured. 
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Figure ‎4.6: Process to check the Authenticity, Confidentiality, Integrity, Ownership, and 
Reachability in the PKBU. 
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o Third Step (Integrity): 
To assert the integrity of the HoA, the CN needs to calculate the hash value of the 
HoA. The CN will compare the calculated hash value with the hash value of the HoA which 
was sent from the MN to the CN via the HA in phase 2 to validate the HoA. If either one of 
the values is negative, the message will be rejected. 
 
o Fourth Step (Reachability and Ownership): 
If the CN can validate the correctness of the HoA in the third step, it means that the 
ownership is proven, and the MN is reachable if the CoA is known. Then the CN will send 
message 4 to the MN as the Binding Acknowledgement (BA). 
 
 Source: CN Destination: MN(CoA) Binding Acknowledgement (BA) 
 
Figure 4.7 shows a framework of the proposed PKBU scheme. The main objective 
of the PKBU protocol is protecting the BU message against malicious attacks by checking 
the ownership, and reachability of the MN‘s HoA and CoA, and scrutinizing the security 
requirements. In the next section, we will evaluate the PKBU protocol to show its 
efficiency and its strengths in defending BU messages against malicious attacks. 
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Figure ‎4.7: Framework of Proposed PKBU Schemes 
Step 3: Private Key used to create Public key 
 
Step 1:  MN creates Private Key 
 
128bit
s 
64bit
s 
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s 
Interface ID 
 
Subnet Prefix 
 
MNPUK = (MNPRK .G)  
 
Step 2: Private Key used to create Interface ID 
 
Node‘s public key  
 
Node A‘s private 
key  
 
G is the base 
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Step 7: CN will use MN‘s public key to verify MN‘s signature, then 
it will decrypt the message and get the CoA and HoA of the MN. 
Step 8: CN will compute hash value of HoA and compare it with the 
hash value which it got via HA. 
CN will compute hash of HoA 
and will compare it with hash 
value which got it via HA 
 
Private Key= Hash (User ID) * i 
 
User‘s ID (for example MAC of MN) 
 
Random Number (i) 
 
Hashi (User ID) 
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4.6 Ownership and Reachability Test 
The BU message is vulnerable to different types of attacks such as: data packet 
interceptions that potentially allow attackers to eavesdrop on contents, thus, violating the 
user‘s confidentiality, or altering transmitted packets, for the attacker‘s own malicious 
purposes; address spoofing attacks; and denial of service or redirection attacks. This 
research will propose solutions for preventing BU message against these attacks, and thus, 
the focus will be on four major areas related to the security of the BU message - 
cryptography, authentication, ownership of the MN‘s HoA, and reachability of the MN at 
the CoA. Cryptography allows the transmitted data to be scrambled to render it 
undecipherable. In this way, intercepted packets are completely unreadable, and only those 
possessing the appropriate key can decrypt the data to make it readable. Authentication is 
the process of verifying the authenticity of the nodes involved in a communication, while 
ownership and reachability check the correctness of the MN‘s HoA and CoA. The exchange 
of messages between the MN and the CN provides strong evidence to CN regarding the 
ownership of the MN's HoA. This is done using a one-way hash function to create IPv6 
addresses along with the BU message that is signed using the MN own private key. In 
addition, in the proposed method, the hash value of the MN's HoA is sent in Message 1 (See 
section 4.5.1) to the CN through the HA. The MN then sends the HoA to the CN in Message 
3 (See Section 4.5.1), the CN will calculate the HoA hash value and compare it with the 
hash value in Message 1 received via the HA. Thus, the reachability of the CoA is checked. 
In the rest of this section, Session hijacking, MITM attacks, and DoS attacks are simulated 
in order to evaluate the security requirements, ownership of the HoA, and reachability of 
the CoA.  
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4.6.1 Session hijacking  Attack 
The proposed methods can prevent this attack because an attacker does not have the 
MN‟s private key to sign the message containing the CoA (see Section 4.5.1). Also, the CN 
will use the MN‟s public key to verify that the signature does not match the attacker‟s 
private key. If the authentication process fails, it means that the HoA and the CoA do not 
belong to the MN, which in turn, means that the ownership and the reachability checks have 
failed, and the CN will not direct the data traffic to the attacker. As a result, the BU 
message will be protected against session hijacking attacks (Figure 4.8). 
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Figure ‎4.8: Protection against Session Hijacking Attack 
 
4.6.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
This attack can be prevented by using the proposed methods because of the node‘s 
signature, hash function, and cryptography algorithm. Figure 4.9 shows that if an attacker 
sends a BU message to the CN, the CN will check the ownership and the reachability of the 
IP addresses. In the proposed method, the ownership of the MN‘s IP address is checked by 
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using the MN‟s private key to create a 128-bit IP address which is secure, and cannot be 
spoofed by the attacker. In addition, the proposed method also checks the reachability of 
the IP address. To do this, the MN will send its HoA hash value to the CN via the HA, and 
the CN will then compute the HoA‟s hash value and compare it to the previous value. The 
attacker does not have the MN‟s private key to sign the message containing the CoA. Thus, 
by checking the authenticity, ownership, and reachability of the IP address, the CN can 
ensure that the BU message is from a valid MN and not from an attacker. An attack would 
only happen if the attacker has the MN‘s public and private key, the CN‘s public and MN‟s 
HoA. The proposed methods make it very difficult to get the node‘s private keys, to mount 
a MITM attack. In addition, in an MITM attack, it is not possible for the attacker to 
eavesdrop on the users‘ message and compromise the user‘s confidentiality because the 
message is encrypted using cryptography algorithms. 
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Due to HoA and signature, this attack will also be prevented using 
the proposed protocol. This is done when the MN sends his/her hash 
value of HoA to the CN via HA, thus resulting in CN computing the 
hash value of HoA and comparing it with the previous hash value 
via HA. This is because the MN's private key used to sign in the 
message that contains CoA is not known to the attacker. However 
the attack could happen if the attacker has the MN‘s public key, 
CN‘s public key, MN(HoA) and node‘s private key. Thus we can 
conclude that this protocol will prevent the attacker from getting the 
security information of the message.
 
Figure ‎4.9: Protect Against Man-In-The-Middle Attack 
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4.6.3 Denial-of-Service Attack 
The proposed methods can also prevent DoS attacks. The CN will not accept a new 
CoA if a new message carries an unverified CoA. To verify the CoA, the CN must first 
verify the authenticity of the MN.  The CN uses the MN‟s public key to verify the signature 
which is created based on the MN‘s private key. The signature cannot be verified if the 
attacker does not know the MN‟s private key that was generated based on the proposed 
method. The CN then checks the confidentiality of the message by decrypting the message 
using its own private key, and subsequently, the CN can get the HoA and the CoA, and 
check the ownership of the MN‘s HoA, and the reachability of the CoA (Figure 4.10).   
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Figure ‎4.10: Protection against DoS Attack 
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4.7 Summary 
The framework for PKBU protocol was discussed in this chapter. This protocol can 
ensure a secure connection between the CNs and the MNs, and protect the BU message 
against the MITM attacks, session hijacking attacks, and DoS attacks. These objectives 
have been achieved through the use of various methods and strategies as follows: 
1. Using an Infrastructure-less algorithm instead of an Infrastructure-based algorithm, and 
using asymmetric cryptography instead of symmetric cryptography. 
2. Development of a method  to check the ownership of the MN‘s HoA because the MN 
must ensure the CN that: 
a. the MN owns the HoA 
b. the actual BU request belongs the MN. 
3. Development of a method to verify that the MN is reachable at the claimed CoAs. 
Based on our objectives, PKBU uses the MN‟s private key to create a secure IP 
address, and then uses it to check the ownership of the MN‘s HoA and to check the 
reachability of the MN at the claimed CoA. The PKBU was evaluated using different attack 
scenarios, and the results show that the protocol can be used to protect the BU message 
against security threats such as MITM attacks, DoS attacks, and session hijacking attacks. 
PKBU also aids all the security services by protecting data integrity, confidentiality, and 
node authentication. A formal evaluation and simulation modelling of the proposed 
protocol is presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 : FORMAL ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION 
OF THE PRIVATE KEY-BASED BINDING UPDATE 
PROTOCOL 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the formal security verification and simulation of the PKBU 
protocol. Section 5.2 presents the formal analyses of the PKBU protocol, while Section 5.3 
presents the simulation modelling. Finally, section 5.4 is the chapter summary. 
 
5.2 Formal Analysis of the Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) 
Protocol  
Formal verification of a security protocol is useful for identifying security flaws that 
are often subtle, and difficult to find (Datta et al., 2007). In this section, the protocol 
security features are discussed and the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) framework is 
used with the formal verification methods. In the PCL framework, logical methods and 
procedures will be used to prove the correctness of the protocol. It is useful in verifying the 
authenticity, secrecy, and other protocol security features (Datta, Derek, Mitchell, & 
Pavlovic, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005; Datta et al., 2007; Datta, Derek, Mitchell, & 
Warinschi, 2006; Roy, Datta, Derek, Mitchell, & Seifert, 2006). Therefore, the PCL 
method was chosen to test and verify the PKBU protocol.  
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5.2.1 Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) 
The Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) is a tool for testing and proving the security 
properties of a particular network protocol, especially, one that uses symmetric and public 
key cryptography. The logic behind this method is a process calculus that has different 
methods of testing the protocols that involve random number generation, message sending 
and receiving, performing decryption, and verifying digital signatures. This proven system 
consists of several steps that also contain information about the individual protocol actions, 
and inference rules that produce the assertion result of the protocol. Even though the 
assertion result is produced by following the protocol steps, sound logic is also used by 
having each provable assertion containing a sequence of actions to be executed by the 
protocol, and with each action and the following arbitrary actions to be executed by a 
malicious attacker. The compositional reasoning for complex security is supported by PCL, 
and this is being applied in numerous industry standards such as SSL/TLS, IEEE, 802.11i, 
and Kerberos V5. 
The PCL‘s basic assertion is similar to the Hoare logic (Hoare, 1969), and the 
dynamic logic (Harel, Kozen, & Tiuryn, 2001). By using the formulae [ ]XP  , once the 
actions P are executed in thread X, the resulting state of formulae   is true when the 
starting state of formula  is true. While actions of P in thread X is only mentioned in this 
formula, the state of P after X could be the result of actions along with the additional 
actions performed by other threads. This may include the arbitrary actions of attackers. 
PCL has several predicated actions such as Send (X; t), Receive (X; t), New (X; t), Decrypt 
(X; t), and Verify(X; t). It asserts that specific actions have been performed by the named 
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thread. For example, if thread X sends the term t message, then Send(X; t) will hold a run. 
There is one class of secrecy property that can be specified by using the predicate           
Has (X; t). This means that t is generated from the elements from X, which is either from 
generating (using a new action) or receiving a constituent that does not hide under a key 
encryption from X. The Honest ( X ) is a predicator that is unique to PCL. It asserts that the 
protocol prescribes all the actions of X . When one party follows the protocol‘s prescribed 
steps, then it is assumed that Honest is used. For example, if a CN receives a transaction 
initiation from the MN and specifies that only the CN will have knowledge of the data 
being sent, it will explicitly assume that the CN is honest. The CN may make known its 
private key to attackers if it is not honest, thus, allowing attackers to decrypt the messages 
it intercepted.  
There are several categories of the PCL axioms and inference rules. A simple yet 
necessary axiom class states that the indicated thread has performed the action once the 
action is done. Another axiom class specifies the cryptographic operation properties. For 
example, when an axiom reflects the un-forgeability property of a particular digital signal, 
it states that the agent must have generated a signature when it has been verified as an 
honest agent. The message will have the generated signature, and is sent out in earlier 
messages. 
 
5.2.2 Modelling of Private Key-based Binding Update (PKBU) Protocol  
The protocols sections must first be set as mathematical objects and define their 
execution before we can formally state and prove the security properties of the protocol. 
One of the important parts in analysing security capabilities is to understand how an honest 
principal in a protocol responds to messages from a malicious attacker. Next, there will be 
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explanation on how the PKBU protocol is represented. The definition below shows the role 
of the MN. The actions taken by the MN after creating the 128-bit IP address, are based on 
the private and public keys, and the subnet prefix are as follows: 
1. Create a new message that has the HoA hash value 
2. Send the HoA hash value via the HA to the CN 
3. Send a secure message directly to the CN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The definition below shows the roles undertaken by the HA where the HA sends 
messages from the MN to the CN. This is with the assumption that the message from MN 
has already been verified by the HA before it is sent to the CN. 
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The definition below shows the role of the CN. The CN will first receive a message 
which contains a hash value from the MN through the HA. The CN will also receive another 
message sent directly from the MN.  
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The session authentication information is stored in the security property. The 
concept of matching conversation forms the basis used in the authentication property in 
PCL. The idea behind this concept is that after the CN has performed its role, the existing 
role intended for the HA and MN is proven via the corresponding view during interactions.  
For CˆN communicating with MˆN and HˆA , matching conversations are formulated 
PKBU
defined, below. 
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The above definition shows that if the MN, HA and CN are honest, they will execute 
the actions expressed in the PKBU  formulae. This will confirm the authenticity of the 
authenticators.  The CN receives the message in the PKBU protocol, therefore, if it 
authenticates the MN, both the MN and the CN are now mutually authenticated. By using 
this definition, we can conclude the following theorem: 
1 2 1 2 3
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ ˆ
PKBU PKBU PKBU PKBU PKBU
PKBU
Honest MN Honest HA Honest CN
MN HA CN
  

    
  
  
 
 
where: 
1PKBU , 2PKBU  and 3PKBU  state the PKBU protocol‘s pre-condition. This 
means that the MN, HA and CN will share the MN HAK  , MN CNK  and CN HAK   before the 
protocol is executed. Both 1PKBU  and 2PKBU  specify that the MN, the HA and the CN 
drive the private key, as shown in the definition below. 
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ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ: ( ( ) ( ) ( , ))
:
PKBU MN HA
PKBU MN CN
PKBU HA CN
PKBU
Honest MN Honest HA Has X K X MN X HA
Honest MN Honest CN Has X K X MN X CN
Honest HA Honest CN Has X K X HA X CN
Comput






      
      
      
 
2
ˆ ˆ( , ( {| { || } |})) ( ( , )
( , {| { || } |}))
ˆ ˆ ˆ: ( , ( , ) ( ( , )
ˆ( , ( , )))
SK MN CN
SK MN CN
HA CN
HA CN
MN K
MN K
PKBU K
K
es X SIG ENC HoA CoA Send X m
Contains m SIG ENC HoA CoA
Computes X HASH X HoA Send X m Contains
m HASH X HoA




  
    
 
Table 5.1 shows the encryption, and signature axioms for PKBU. It will be used as 
the proof, below, of the proposed PKBU. The explanation is presented below: 
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Table ‎5.1 : Axioms for protocol actions and encryption and signature axioms for PKBU 
Extended axioms Explanations 
AA1 
 
X
a a   
If X has completed an action in a 
role, then the matching predicate 
states that the action that had 
occurred in the past is true. 
AA4 
1 1[ ,..., ] ...k X ka a a a    
After thread X performs actions 
a1,.., ak in sequence, the action 
predicates corresponding to the 
actions are ordered in the same 
sequence. 
AR1 
1 1 2
2
Re ( , ( ))[ ( ) ( )]
Re ( , ( ))
Xceive X p t match p t as p t
ceive X p t
 
It is used to model a method for 
obtaining information about 
structure of terms as they are 
received. 
HASH1 
( , { }) ( , ) ( , )KCompute X HASH t Has X k Has X t   
The principal possesses both t and k 
if it has the hashed term t using the 
k key. 
HASH3 
Re ( , { }) . ( , { })
( , { })
K K
K
ceive X HASH t Z Computes Z HASH t
Send Z HASH t
  
 
If a hashed term is received by X, 
then another principal Z must have 
been hashed and sent before. 
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HASH4 
( , { }) ( , { })
( , . ( , { })
( , { }) ( , { }))
K K
K
K K
Has X HASH t Compute X HASH t
Z m Computes Z HASH t Send
Z HASH t Contains m HASH t

  

 
If the hashed term is possessed by 
X, then it either X hashes the term 
or another principal Z must have 
hashed the term and sent it in 
previously. 
SEC 
( ) ( , { }, )kHonest X PkDec Y ENC t k Y X  
 
In order to decrypt a term that has 
been encrypted with a public key, 
the principal needs to possess the 
corresponding private key. 
ENC1 
( , ) ( , ) ( , { })
( , { })
k
k
Has X t Has X k Computes X ENC t
Has X ENC t
 

 
If the term and key are known, then 
the principal X can be encrypted 
using k key and t term. 
ENC3
 
( , { }) ( , { })
( , ) ( , )
k kComputes X ENC t Has X ENC t
Has X k Has X t

   
If the principal possesses t and k, 
then it has been encrypted using the 
t term and k key. 
VER
 
( ) ( , { }, ) . ( , )
( , { })
k
k
Honest X Verify Y SIG t k X Y X Send X m
Contains m SIG t
   
 
Signing a term cannot be denied by 
the principal (signature un-
forgeability). 
PENC
 
( , { }, )
. ( , ) ( , { })
k
k
PKDec X ENC t k
Z Send Z m Contains m ENC t

   
If a term can be decrypted by X 
using its private key, then another 
principal Z must have encrypted the 
term and sent it previously. 
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A matching conversation is formulated from the authentication property ( PKBU ). 
The following part is the proof of the security guarantee for the nodes‘ role in PKBU 
protocol. The explanation of this formal proof is as follows: 
1. The CN knows that every action is in proper order i.e., AA1, AR1, and AA4 are 
lined up to show that a sequence of actions has been performed by the CN. 
2. Once the BUm is received and verified by the CN, some entity ( MˆN ) will have the 
{ }MN CNKSIG t and { }kENC t . They sent out the BUm  as shown in line (2) in        
Table 5.2. 
3. The private key is needed by the CN for decrypting a term encrypted with the 
related public key, as explained in line (3) in Table 5.2. 
4. If the term and the key are known, then the principal MˆN is able to encrypt it using 
the k key and t term, as shown in line (4) in Table 5.2. 
5. The principal possesses the t and k if the term t and the key k are used by the MˆN
for encryption, as shown in line (5) in Table 5.2. 
6. If the private key is being used successfully by the CˆN for decryption, then another 
principal ( MˆN ) must have encrypted and sent the term previously, as described in 
line (6) in Table 5.2. 
7. The CN has the verified signed term t by using public key k if the MN is honest, as 
described in line (7) and (8) in Table 5.2. 
8. The correctness of the send and receive message between the MN and CN in a 
PKBU protocol is shown in line (9) and (10) in Table 5.2. 
9. If the CN receives a value that is hashed, then another entity HˆA  must have 
InitCR( , )HA CNKHASH CN m it and sent it out, as explained in line (11) in Table 5.2. 
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10. The HA possesses both the term t and the key k if it has successfully hashed a term 
using t and k, as shown in line (12) in Table 5.2. 
11. If the CN has a term that is hashed, then either another principal has hashed the term 
and sent it out previously, or the CN itself has hashed the term, as indicated in line 
(13) in Table 5.2. 
12. The correctness of the send and receive messages between the HA and the CN in the 
PKBU protocol is shown in line (14) and line (15), respectively, in Table 5.2. 
13. All the actions in line (16) matched as indicated in line (1), (9), (10), (14) and (15) 
in Table 5.2. Therefore, the CN can now deduce that the session authentication in 
the security property is guaranteed by the PKBU protocol. 
 
Table ‎5.2: Proof of PKBU in PCL language 
Line PKBU written in PCL language 
(1) AA1, 
AR1,AA4 
     
InitCR InitCR
InitCR
BU
[ : ]
ˆˆReceive ( ,{ , , , ( , ))
ˆˆ( , , , )
ˆˆReceive ( ,{ , , {| { || } |}, })
CN HA
MN CN
CN
K
K k
PKBU CorrespondingNode
CN HA CN m HASH CN m
Send CN MN CN am
CN MN CN SIG ENC HoA COA m




 
(2) AR1,HASH3 2 BU
BU
ˆˆ[Receive , , ; match /CN, , , ;match
ˆ/ ( , { }, ) match /
ˆˆ( , { }, )] Re ( ,{ , , ,
ˆ( , { }, )}) . ( , )
MN CN
MN CN
PKBU
K MN CN
k CN
K MN CN
MN CN m m m ver dec
ver Verify CN SIG t K dec PKDec
CN ENC t k ceive CN MN CN m Verify
CN SIG t K Z Send CN m Contai




   
BU
BU
Re ( ,{
}) Re
ˆ ˆˆ( , { }) , , , , (
ˆˆ, { }, ) ,{ , , ,
( , { }, )})
(
. ( , )
( , { })
MN CN
k
K MN CN
k
k
ns
m SIG t MN CN CN m Verify CN
SIG t K CN MN CN m
PKDec CN ENC t k X Send X m
Contain
ceive CN
ceiv
s m EN t
e
C
 
  


 
(3) SEC ( ) ( , { }, )kHonest MN PkDec CN ENC t k
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(4) ENC1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , { })
( , { })
k
k
Has MN t Has MN k Computes MN ENC t
Has MN ENC t
 

 
(5) ENC3 ( , { }) ( , { })
( , ) ( , )
K KComputes MN ENC t Has MN ENC t
Has MN k Has MN t
 

 
(6) PENC ( , { }, ) . ( . )
( , { })
K
K
PKDec CN ENC t k MN Send MN m
Contatins m ENC t
  
 
(7) VER ( ) ( , { }, )
. ( , ) ( , { })
k
K
Honest MN Verify CN SIG t k CN MN
MN Send MN m Contains m SIG t
   
 
 
(8) 1PKBU  ( , ) ( , ( , { }))
( , ) ( , ( , { }, ))
MN CNMN CN K
k
Has Z K Computes Z Verify CN SIG t
Has X k Computes X PKDec CN ENC t k
 

 
(9) (2)-(8) 
 
 
2 BU
 
ˆˆ[Receive , , ; match /CN, , , ;match
ˆ/ ( , { }, ) match /
ˆ( , { }, )] ( , ) ( , ( ,
ˆ{ }, )) ( , ( ,
MN CN
MN CN
PKBU
K MN CN
k CN MN CN
K MN CN
MN CN m m m ver dec
ver Verify CN SIG t K dec PKDec
CN ENC t k Has Z K Has Z Verify CN
SIG t K Computes Z Verify CN
SI








{ }, )) ( , ) ( , )
( , ( , { }, )) ( ,
( , { }, )) ( , )
MN CNK MN CN MN CN
k
k
G t K Has Z K Has X k
Has X PKDec CN ENC t k Computes X
PKDec CN ENC t k Has X k
   
 

 
(10) AA4, 
 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( , , , )
ˆˆRe ( , , , )
BU
BU
Honest CN Honest MN Send MN MN CN m
ceive CN MN CN m
 

 
(11) 
 
HASH3, 
ARP 
2 InitCR InitCR
InitCR InitCR
InitCR
InitCR InitCR
ˆˆ[Receive , , ; match / ( , )
ˆˆ] Re ( ,{ , , , ( , )})
.( ( , ( , )) ( ,{ ,
, ( , )}
HA CN
HA CN
HA CN
HA CN
PKBU K
CN K
K
K
HA CN m m HASH CN m
ceive CN HA CN m HASH CN m
Z Computes Z HASH CN m Send Z CN
m HASH CN m
 




 
InitCR InitCR
ˆˆ)) Re ( ,{ , ,
, , ( , )}))HA CNK
ceive CN HA CN
CN m HASH CN m

 
(12) HASH1 InitCR
InitCR
( , ( , )) ( , )
( ,{ , })
HA CN HA CNK KComputes Z HASH y m Has Z
Has Z y m
 

 (13) HASH4 ( , { }) ( , { })
, . ( , { }) ( , )
( , { })
HA CN HA CN
HA CN
HA CN
K K
K
K
Has CN HASH t Computes CN HASH t HA
m Computes HA HASH t Send HA m
Contains m HASH t
 


 
 
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(14) (13), 
 
2 InitCR
InitCR
ˆˆ[Receive , , ; match /
ˆ ˆ( , )] ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( , )
HA CNPKBU K
CN
HA CN
HA CN m m HASH
CN m Honest CN Honest HA Has
Z K Z CN Z HA
 

 
   
 
(15) (11), (14) 2 InitCR
InitCR
InitCR InitCR
ˆˆ[Receive , , ; match /
ˆ ˆ( , )] ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , , , ) Re ( , , , )
HA CNPKBU K
CN
HA CN m m HASH
CN m Honest CN Honest HA Send
HA HA CN m ceive CN HA CN m
 
 

 
(16) (1),(6),(9), 
(10),(14) 
2 3 
InitCR InitCR
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , , , ) Re ( , , , )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , , , ) Re ( , , , )
PKBU PKBU
BU BU
Honest MN Honest CN Honest HA
Send HA HA CN m ceive CN HA CN m
Send MN HA CN m ceive CN MN CN m
   
 
  
 
 
The formal verification of the PKBU protocol has further confirmed our intuitive 
analysis that our protocol has satisfied the security requirements, and defended against 
known attacks. In the next section, we will focus on the simulation modeling of the PKBU 
protocol. 
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5.3 Simulation Modelling 
The network simulator used to program the proposed solution is the       
INETMANET-2.0 framework in OMNeT++ (Varga, 2010). OMNeT++ has powerful 
graphical tools that can display the simulation statistics and it is event-driven. In order to 
denote the network design, it uses hierarchically-linked domains. The advantage of this 
simulator is that it is possible to run different configuration on the layout and connection 
without having to reprogram it every time. Only appropriate variables and certain codes 
need to be modified to perform the necessary tasks and test. The OMNeT ++ network 
simulator was developed to give a generic component architecture. This allows the 
designers to define the network elements, protocols, or the wireless channels as model 
components or ―modules‖, easily.  
C++ is the programming language used in OMNeT++. In the OMNeT++ simulation, 
the components required are: the NED file which contains the network definitions where all 
the nodes and connections between them are defined; the .CC files and .msg class where .cc 
files act as the main body of the simulation code. It defines the node's behaviour and how it 
handles and forwards messages; and the .msg component defines the message packet sent 
between the nodes and is automatically generated by the simulation. 
 
5.3.1 Private Key-based Binding Update Protocol Description and Design 
Figure 5.1 describes the PKBU network topology that has been created.  It shows 
the ―nodes‖ being connected together via ―links‖. These nodes can be blocks, entities, 
modules, etc, while the links can either be the channels, connections, etc. To ease the 
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implementation of PKBU, a pair of .ned files is created. One of these .ned files is for each 
simple module while another .ned file is for the network that contains these simple 
modules. In OMNeT ++, once the model has been created, the parameters must be defined 
thus, some functions that are needed by the model can be executed. They are configured via 
an INI file and the owner of these parameters might be the model, or its modules or sub-
modules. They can be accessed in their normal mode as well as the source mode. We 
implement our specific message for a model evaluation using the message files. They 
contain specific codes of various defined parameters, as well as the set values from other 
C++ programs. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.1: Topology of PKBU Network 
 Modules in PKBU 
Figure 5.1, shows a network file, called MIPv6Network_H.ned which contains the 
following entities: 
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 A single stationary CN connected to the Internet through the router R. 
 The home link contains a single MN. 
 The home link is represented by an HA. 
 There are two access points: AP_Home and AP_Home1. 
The location of the nodes in the network is shown in Figure 5.1. The following 
modules are applied to the entities in the PKBU protocol: 
 
o CorrespondentNode6: It is an IPv6 host that comes with MIPv6 support. It has a 
Binding Cache that is updated with every received BU. The CN that uses this 
CorrespondentNode6 module is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure ‎5.2: The CN Hierarchy Model  
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o WirelessHost6: An entity that has one wireless card in infrastructure mode, and 
supports handover as well as the MIPv6 protocol. Figure 5.3 shows the MN which 
uses the WirelessHost6 module.   
 
 
Figure ‎5.3: The MN Hierarchy Model 
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o HomeAgent6: An operating HA that supports MIPv6 and is configured from an 
IPv6 router. The usage of the HomeAgent6 on a HA is shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
Figure ‎5.4: The Home_Agent Hierarchy Model  
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o AccessPoint: A standard access point that supports multiple wireless radios and 
Ethernet ports.  Figure 5.5 illustrates the AP_Home which uses the AccessPoint 
module.  
 
Figure ‎5.5: The AP_Home Hierarchy Model   
 
o EtherHub: Messages are broadcasted to every other port once it arrives at one port. 
Similar data rates on all connecting incoming and outgoing rates are required in 
order for the model to function correctly.  
 
o ChannelControl: If a network model contains mobile or wireless nodes, then it 
will have exactly one ChannelControl module. This module is kept informed of the 
movements and location of the nodes, and it will determine which of the nodes are 
within interference distance or which is within the communication. This type of 
information will be then used for transmission by the nodes‘ radio interface. 
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 Modules connection 
Communication between the modules is done by message passing. The module also 
handles timers or timeouts by sending itself messages (self-messages). These messages 
could either come from a class cMessage, or from a class that is cMessage-based. They are 
delivered to the module‘s handleMessage method where we will redefine and add codes 
into. Everything that we want the module to do is contained in the handleMessage() 
method. The messages are defined for interpretation when there are messages travelling 
between different entities, for example, HA-MN, HA-CN, or MN-CN.  The MgmtAP and 
MgmtSTA classes are used to manage the frames of the HA, the MN and the CN.  
 
5.3.2 Running Simulation 
This section discusses the PKBU steps after running the simulation.  
 First, in order for the MN to receive the AP‘s broadcast beacons, it has to be within 
the range of the AP. Before the MN and the AP start exchanging messages, the 
authentication and association messages have to be exchanged between the nodes.  
o This is done with the MN sending a message containing the hashed HoA and 
the public key of the MN to the AP.  The message also contains a request for 
the CN‘s public key.  
 In order for this message (in the form of an IPv6 packet) to be sent through the 
airframe, it has to be encapsulated.  
o This means that certain fields have to be set before sending it as an 
―AirFrame” packet. The process of encapsulation has been written while the 
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AP‘s IPv6 address has been set to the ―ReceiverAddress‖ variable in its 
function.  
 The packet is ready to be sent to the “MAC” layer, which is the next layer.  
o First, all ―initialise ()” functions will be called once the simulation begins.  
o Then the ―ReceiveChangeNotification‖ function is called whenever the host 
changes its location. The timer that was defined earlier during the initialising 
process is set to a pre-configured value. The value is then sent to the 
―HandleTimer ()‖ function. During the simulation, this function will receive 
different types of messages, and will react accordingly to those messages.  
 The AP will send an acknowledgement back to the MN when it receives the MN‘s 
message.  
 The AP will direct the MN‘s message to the HA, which will,  in turn, send it to the 
CN‘s router.  
 Once the CN receives the message, the “HandleDataFrame ()” function will be 
executed.   
o This function will then de-encapsulate the message and extract the 
information contained in it. The extracted message is processed and the 
appropriate information is sent back. The following step is to send that 
processed message with the relevant information back to the MN.   
 The CN, in turn, will receive the message from the MN. The MN‘s HoA and CoA 
which were encrypted by the CN‘s public key and signed by MN‘s private key is 
stored in this message.  
o Before sending the message via the airframe form of IPv6 packet, it has to 
be encapsulated.  The “HandleDateFrame ()” is called again when the CN 
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receives the message. The function will de-encapsulate the message and 
extract the information in it. The CN then checks the validity of the message 
signature and the correctness of the HoA.  
 The CN will authenticate the MN‘s signature using the MN‘s public key. 
  The CN will decrypt the message which contains the MN‘s CoA and HoA.  
 The hash value of the HoA is calculated and compared with the hash value of the 
first message.  
o The message is rejected if a negative result is received by either the MN or 
the CN. However, if the result is positive, then the CN is assured of the 
correctness of the MN‘s HoA and CoA. The MN assures the CN by using this 
method to validate the ownership of the MN‘s HoA, and the reachability of 
the CoA. This completes the last step. 
Figure 5.6 shows the initialising channel for PKBU after running the project. Figure 
5.7 and Figure 5.8 show some of the events of the nodes. 
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Figure ‎5.6: Channel Initialising in PKBU 
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Figure ‎5.7: Start PKBU Events 
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Figure ‎5.8: Message Exchanged between the Nodes 
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Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 are the sequence charts for PKBU. By clicking on each event, the corresponding log lines in the event can 
be viewed.  
 
Figure ‎5.9: Elog File for Event 9 to 14 
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Figure ‎5.10 : Elog File for Event 17 to 29 
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The following scenarios describe the possible main attacks and their simulation: 
1. The DoS attacks can be shown in the following scenario. The CN corresponds with 
the MN1 and vice versa. For example, if a data stream is being transmitted between the 
two nodes, the attacker node (AN1), as shown in Figure 5.11, will send a BU message 
containing the HoA of the MN1as its HoA, and the CoA of MN2 is sent to the CN. 
Once the CN receives the BU message, it updates its binding cache with an entry of the 
MN1. Also, this entry will be updated to the CoA with the MN2 address.  
 
Figure ‎5.11: Attacks Simulation for PKBU Protocol in OMNeT ++ 
2.  Once the attacks begin, the packets that are meant for the MN1 from the CN will go 
to MN2, instead. This happens due to the illegitimate binding cache entry that was 
created when the AN1 sent the BU message to the CN. The packet that was supposed 
to be delivered to the MN1 has been blocked. 
3.  Any unnecessary data traffic associated with the attacker must now be handled by 
the CN.  It is used as a packet reflector by the AN1 or the attack perpetrator. 
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4. In another method of attack, the BU message is sent to the CN by the AN and the 
AN sets its IP address as the CoA of the MN1. 
5. Another method of attack is session hijacking, that can be explained in the 
following scenario. Due to the illegitimate Binding Cash (BC) entry that was created 
when the AN sent the BU, any packet exchanged between the MN and the CN will 
actually happen between the CN and the AN. Thus, the MN1 has been denied any 
packet rightfully meant for it. 
6.  The AN can also act as the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM). It can set the IP address 
as the CoA of the MN1 in the BC entry of the CN by sending a BU message to the CN. 
This allows any message meant for the MN to be captured by the AN. 
7.  As for the MITM, the AN can eavesdrop on the packets and send the packets to the 
MN. It can also edit these packets and send those incorrect packets to the MN. 
8.  Based on the first scenario, the MN2 is being attacked by unwanted and unsolicited 
streams of data traffic. It can also be described as the CN being attacked by data that is 
streamed to "nowhere".  In the second scenario, the CN creates a binding with the 
MN'sCoA but sends subsequent data traffic to the AN believing that it is the new CoA 
of the MN. However, the MN will not receive the intended data. In this type of attack, 
the data packets will go to the AN instead of being exchanged between the MN and the 
CN. 
9. In all scenarios mentioned in steps 1 to 8, there are four legitimate nodes (HA, MN1, 
MN2, CN) while there is one illegitimate node (AN1). This shows that the whole 
mobile network service can be put at risk by a single comprehensive attack. 
10.  We have implemented these attacks as well as presented the mitigation plan where 
the legitimate entities involved can work together to counter the attacks. The 
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mitigation plan must first detect false binding attacks, MITM attacks, and DoS attacks, 
reliably. In this context, the usefulness of PKBU is evident because it has rendered the 
BU messages secure and valid before allowing the MN to send them to the CN. 
11. We propose the creation of a safe HoA as well as appropriate digital signatures, 
encryption algorithms, and hash functions within the proposed PKBU protocol.  
 
 Detection and Mitigation Simulation 
The following steps explain the simulated detection and mitigation plan: 
1. The HoA of MN1 can be reclaimed if the AN sends a fake BU to the CN. It can do 
this by sending a different CoA in the BU message. The CN will proceed to compare 
the hash value of the HoA in the BU message with the original hash value of the HoA. 
If the comparison result is negative, that means the MN does not own the new HoA. 
2. The point of detection could be the CN itself when it is updating the BC after the 
BU is received. In PKBU, the BU packet is de-encapsulated after the CN receives it. It 
can proceed with ensuring that the signature used to sign the BU message is valid. 
Based on the PKBU framework, (as in the Chapter 4), the MN signs the BU message. 
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used to digitally sign the 
BU. If the verification of the signature is correct, the CN can be sure that the packet 
was sent by the MN. The digital signature (r, s) of the BU message can be verified 
using the following steps:  
1. Acquire a valid copy of the sender public key (E, P, n, Q).  
2. Verify r and s are integers in the interval [1, n-1].  
3. Compute w = s-1 mod n and h(m).  
4. Compute u1= h(m).w mod n and u2 = r.w mod n.  
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5. Compute u1P+u2Q = (x0 , y0) and v = x0 mod n.  
6. The signature is accepted only if v=r.  
 
In their research, A. Khaled and M. AL-Kayali found that the Elliptic Curve Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) algorithm provides strong security by merely using 
smaller keys. As the key is small, the memory required to store it would also be small. 
This keeps the size of the data transferred between the nodes to the minimum, thus, 
leading to shorter transmission time. The applications in the MNs require strong 
security features which are only achievable by using long keys. By using ECC, the MN 
can maintain their cost while still be able to provide strong security by using smaller 
size keys.  
The processing time is greatly reduced in ECC, especially if the binary field GF(2
k
) 
(Appendix A) is applied. The MN can manage the elliptic curve domain parameters 
and the private key as well as generate the ECDSA signatures. In addition, the system 
is only limited to 162-bit size curves. 
3. The CN can function as the detection point itself. Once the verification of the 
signature is done after it has de-encapsulated the packet, it will begin to decrypt the 
message. The MN will use the CN's public key to encrypt the message before sending 
the packet to the CN. Based on the false binding update and the MITM attack scenarios 
(as in Section 4.6) the AN can eavesdrop on the BU packet. The whole message has to 
be signed using the private key belonging to MN1, which the AN does not have. If the 
AN decides to use parameters other than the original MN parameters as a signature, 
then the CN will not able to positively verify the signature since the CN uses the MN's 
parameter as the basis for verification.   
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4. Once the CN has finished the decryption process, the MN's HoA and CoA are 
retrieved.  
5. In the PKBU framework (as in Chapter 4), the CN will receive packets from the 
MN1 via the HA. The hash value of MN1's HoA is contained in the packet. It is used by 
the CN to verify the HoA ownership. The CN will call a function to calculate the HoA 
hash value and then compare it with the HoA hash value it receives from the HA. If the 
function returns a TRUE value, then it is verified that the sender of the packet is 
actually MN1. The CN will proceed to update the BC entry in regard to the MN, 
otherwise the CN will reject the update. The verified packet from the MN is now 
accepted by the CN and the traffic between the CN and the MN can now begin with the 
MN1's new CoA. 
6. This is a classic example of defeating the DoS attacks, collaboratively. At the end of 
the simulation, it is evident that the attack was launched by a malicious entity and the 
legitimate nodes had worked together to detect the DoS, MITM, and session hijacking 
attacks. It is evident that attack detection can be done in a collaborative manner by 
using the PKBU protocol. 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter discusses the evaluation of the PKBU protocol. The protocol was first 
formally evaluated with respect to the security requirements, and its effectiveness in 
countering known security attacks, as described in Chapter 2.  The evaluation results 
confirmed that the PKBU protocol satisfies the security requirements, and it is effective in 
defending BUs against the known attacks. This chapter also presents the PKBU protocol 
reachability design, ownership, and protection of BU message against the known attacks. 
Initially, the PKBU establishes connections between nodes based on Infrastructure-less 
algorithms, following which it verifies the MN‘s reachability at the new IP address in a 
foreign network. The PKBU then determines whether the MN owns the HoA and the CoA. 
A simulation of PKBU model was constructed using OMNeT ++. Model validation was 
carried out using an OMNeT ++ debugger theoretical calculation.  
The features of the proposed PKBU protocol can be summarized, as follows: 
 It can protect the BU message against MITM attacks, session hijacking attacks, and 
DoS attacks, and make the connection between the MN and the CN secure. 
 It can check the address ownership of the MN. 
 It can check the reachability of the CoA. 
 It can complement the security services to enhance data integrity, data 
confidentiality, and node authentication. 
 
 The following chapter concludes this thesis with recommendations for further work. 
6  
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Chapter 6 : CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusion of the research. It summarises the objectives 
set, the achievements and contribution of the research. It also highlights related area for 
future research.  
The findings from earlier researches have revealed the vulnerability of various 
mobile Internet protocols to security threats, and the need for authenticating the HoA and 
the CoA. In general, the results indicate that the location information in IPv6 must be 
authenticated. The MNs should authenticate themselves every time they move to foreign 
networks. In the absence of a proper authentication process, the packet flow from one node 
to another might be intercepted by a malicious node that could redirect the flow to its 
location or to another fake IP address. As a consequence, the service meant for the a 
legitimate receiver will be denied. These security issues occur because existing protocols 
do not have effective authentication methods to verify that the user is a valid user, or do not 
conceal the HoA and the CoA location data. These shortcomings will, inevitably, lead to 
malicious attacks. Hence, the objectives of this study include: proposing methods to 
authenticate the HoA and the CoA, to protect the BU message against MITM attacks, 
session hijacking attacks, and DoS attacks; and ensure a secure connection between the MN 
and the CN.  
To achieve the objectives we proposed the PKBU protocol. An overview of the 
PKBU as well as the detailed design the PKBU were presented. This was followed by a 
detailed description of the PKBU framework, and an informal analysis of the protocol. The 
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informal analysis was based on the requirements, and attacks such as MITM attacks, 
session hijacking attacks, and DoS attacks. The results show that using this protocol, the 
connection between the CNs and the MNs is secure, and the BU is protected against the 
MITM attacks, session hijacking attacks, and DoS attacks. This has been achieved through 
various methods such as: using asymmetric algorithm instead of symmetric algorithm; 
using the Infrastructure-less algorithms instead of the     Infrastructure-based algorithms; 
and using suitable methods to check the IP address ownership, and reachability. We then 
discussed the outcomes of the security requirements analysis, and the evaluation of the 
protocol. The protocol was formally analysed and then verified using the Protocol 
Composition Logic (PCL) method. We simulated attack scenarios and compared existing 
protocols with the proposed PKBU protocol.  
 
6.2 Achievement of the Objectives 
We have achieved all the research objectives stated in section 1.5, as follows: 
1. A method to assert address ownership: 
We proposed a method to assert the address ownership of the MN by creating 128-bit 
MIPv6 addresses based on the MN‘s private key and computing one-way hash 
function. This provides a way of authenticating the MNs authority. It also allows the 
CN to validate the MN and ensure that it is not a malicious node by checking the 
address ownership. Our proposed method to assert the address ownership of the MN 
relies on the assistance of the MN home link. It requires the home link to enable the CN 
to verify the authenticity of the MN's HoA ownership. This is done by using a 128-bit 
IPv6 address, which consists of a 64-bit subnet prefix and a 64-bit identifier. The 
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strong cryptographic binding between the MN and the CN provided by this method is 
implemented in the interface identifier. Our implementation also requires that the MN 
should have its own private key and public key. In this way, PKI is not needed to prove 
the binding ownership of the MN‘s HoA. The MN retrieves its private and public key 
pair, and the user's ID is used to obtain the node's private and public key pair. In the 
proposed method, the HoA of the MN is verified using the secure interface ID in order 
to check the ownership of the MN‘s IP address. It is based on the MN's private key and 
a valid subnet prefix.  
2. A method to verify the reachability of the MN: 
In our method, the MN‟s public key and the hash value of the MN's HoA is sent from 
the MN to the CN through the HA. The MN will directly send another message to the 
CN. In this message, the MN encrypts the MN‟s CoA and the HoA using the CN‟s 
public key. The encrypted message will be signed with the MN‟s private key. When the 
CN receives these messages from the MN, it uses the MN‟s public key to verify the 
signature, then it decrypts the message and obtain the MN‟s CoA and  HoA.  Then, the 
CN calculates the hash value of the HoA and compares it with the hash value from the 
message received from the MN via the HA. If one of the signature verification, 
decryption or comparison of hash value receives a negative result, the message will be 
rejected. If the results of the checking operations and the validation process are 
positive, the CN is assured that the MN's HoA and the CoA are correct and that the MN 
can be reached at this the CoA.  
3. A method that is protecting the BU messages against MITM, session hijacking, and 
DoS attacks, and to ensure a secure connection between the MN and the CN. 
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We proposed the PKBU protocol. PKBU was evaluated using different attack 
scenarios, and show the results that the protocol can be used to protect the BU message 
against security threats such as MITM attacks, DoS attacks, and session hijacking 
attacks.  
6.3 Contributions 
The main outcome of this research is the development of the PKBU protocol. The 
protocol incorporates the features and functionalities to meet all the research objectives as 
discussed above. Thus, the contributions from the research can be summarised as follows: 
1. The PKBU protocol: 
 device's Interface ID and private key is a new decentralised authentication 
solution. It ensures a more secure communication for the delivery of the 
HoA and the CoA. There is no vulnerable point for an attack to take place, 
thus, making the authentication infrastructure secure; 
 provides reasonable assurance that the user‘s address actually belongs to a 
valid user, and has not been spoofed by an attacker; 
 has a  authentication  process to prove that the location of the 
communicating device is at the correct IP, hence, preventing any address 
spoofing. 
2. Ensuring secure communication for the BU message, especially, between the MNs 
and the CNs. 
3. A solid MN authentication method is provided in the security protocols. This can be 
expanded to include user verification to prevent device and identity theft. 
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4. Protecting the BU message against MITM attacks, session hijacking attacks, and 
DoS attacks by using various methods and strategies, as follows:  
 Using an Infrastructure-less algorithm instead of an Infrastructure-based 
algorithm, and using asymmetric cryptography instead of symmetric 
cryptography.  
  Development of a method to check the ownership of the MN‟s HoA 
because the MN must ensure the CN that:  
a. the MN owns the HoA   
b. the actual BU request belongs to the MN;  
  Development of a method to verify that the MN is reachable at the claimed 
CoAs.  
5. In the informal and formal analyses, the PKBU protocol has successfully proven to 
provide protection for the MN against false binding update. It does not require high 
processing power, and it has a relatively low latency since it requires fewer 
messages, lower number of hash functions, and reduced Round-Trip Time. 
6. The results of the evaluation of the performance of the PKBU protocol using 
INETMANET-2.0 framework in OMNeT ++ simulation, clearly show the PKBU 
protocol is protecting the BU against common attacks. In addition, the protocol has 
also been informally evaluated against standard security requirements, and against 
common attacks. Formal methods have also been used to verify the PKBU security 
features. 
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6.4 Future Work 
7 In view of the rapid increase in the use of mobile devices for communication, there 
are many potential areas of mobile Internet communication security for future research. We 
would like to suggest the following area to be researched as a follow-up to the work 
reported in this thesis. 
8 The main goal of PKBU is to protect the binding message update between the MN 
and the CN in MIPv6. Thus, improving the security of the connection between the MN and 
the HA or between HA and the CN should be further explored.  Also the idea behind the 
PKBU can be used to make the secure connection and protect binding update message 
against attacks in Proxy Mobile IPv6. 
9 In this research, we did not consider the handover latency, and the packet loss 
during a handover. The MIPv6 supports a handover that changes its point of attachment to 
the network when a MN moves to a new IP subnet. The basic handover procedure for the 
mobile IP consists of two components - L2 handover, and L3 handover. The term L2 
handover denotes its support for roaming at the link layer, while the L3 handover occurs at 
the network layer. Usually, the L3 handover is independent of the L2 handover, although it 
must precede the L3 handover. The long handover latency in the MIPv6 degrades the 
perceived quality of service (QoS), especially, the real-time services. The handover latency 
can be eliminated and eventually, the packet loss can be overcome by using a buffering 
mechanism. This is a promising area for further research in the MIPv6 protocol.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Cryptography encrypts and decrypts data with mathematics, and it facilitates 
sending or storing sensitive information over insecure networks. Thus, cryptanalysis is the 
science of breaching secure communication.  
Cryptography is meant to facilitate message exchanges between two people, so they 
are not understood by others  (Wang, Yin, & Yu, 2005).  In other words, people A and B 
should be able to communicate securely using encryption over an insecure channel, and any 
eavesdroppers should not be able to read or alter the clear text (Figure A.1).  
In such a situation, the person sending, receiving or controlling data is called an 
entity. If the entity sends legitimate data, it is called a sender. An entity that receives data is 
called a receiver, who may in fact be an entity trying to destroy data security services 
meant for senders and receivers.  The bad guy disguised as a sender or a receiver can be 
called an adversary, attacker, enemy, eavesdropper, opponent, or intruder (Jesper, 2006).  
Cryptographic strength is measured by observing how much time and resources are 
used to recover plain text.  Then, when encrypting the plaintext, a cryptographic algorithm 
associates itself with a private key to resolve the ciphertext which uses unique values each 
time. Encrypted data security is relative cryptographic algorithm strength as well as key 
confidentiality (Schneier, 1996).   
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Two-part communication 
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 Symmetric 
Symmetric-key is a type of cryptography in which two parties wishing to 
communicate use a secret shared key valid for both encryption and decryption. Here, the 
parties need to trust each other and not reveal the secret-key to anybody. Symmetric-key is 
advantageous especially when large amounts of data get encrypted, but can be problematic 
when key control is for numerous users  (Riedel 2003; Stoneburner, 2001).  Figure A.2 
illustrates a symmetric-key example (Al-Kayali, 2004; Hankerson, Vanstone, & Menezes, 
2004).  
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Symmetric-Key 
 Asymmetric 
Public key cryptography (PKC) is different than a public key, and was put forth in 
1976 by Diffie and Hellman. These keys do not encrypt or decrypt messages, but help 
come up with a single shared secret key.  
PKC involves two types of keys, namely, public and private keys. For example, 
user A wishes to send a message to B. A uses B‟s public key to encrypt a message, while 
A‘s private key is used to sign the message. The receiver B decrypts the message with his 
private key, then uses A‘s public key to authenticate the signature.  Encryption key size is 
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set according to the preferred level of security, because size determines how challenging it 
will be to recover the encrypted data computationally without a secret key. An example of a 
public key example is given in Figure A.3, where the key pair (e,d) is chosen by B with „e‟ 
as the public key sent by B to A over any channel and the private key „d‟ is kept. A encrypts 
the message to send B using B‟s public-key, then B decrypts the ciphertext „c‟ using „d‟  
(Modares, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: Public Key 
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller first proposed Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in 
1985. ECC systems offer public keys, as the same as provided by RSA systems. Security 
depends on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) which can be solved 
by algorithms with fully exponential time. However, the integer factorization problem 
would be solved by sub-exponential-time algorithms (Hankerson et al., 2004). This way, 
ECC can provide comparable security. Different public key cryptography methods provide 
this nowadays, but with smaller key sizes and memory requirements (Table A.1).  For 
instance, a 1024-bit RSA key normally offers the same level of security as a 160-bit elliptic 
curve key. Smaller key sizes have various advantages like storage, speed and efficient 
power and bandwidth usage, since storing keys require less space and faster arithmetic 
processes. In cases when public-key cryptography is used in mobile devices or RFID, for 
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instance, the advantages are essential, which is why ECC is the cryptographic system of 
choice for this thesis.  
Table A.1: NIST Recommended Key Size 
Symmetric-key ECC RSA Comment 
64 bit 128 bit 700 bit Short period security 
80 bit 160 bit 1024 bit Medium period Security 
128 bit 256 bit 2048 Long period Security 
 
Basically, to achieve backward compatibility and security as in smaller, low-end 
controlled devices, existing protocols may use ECC based algorithms.  
Elliptic curves can offer a group structure of points on the curves, determined over a 
finite field for implementing cryptographic schemes. The curve elements, or points, act as 
group identity parts. To perform group operation, some finite field based arithmetic 
operations can be done, as presented later (Kumar, 2006). 
Calculating points in the prime field elliptic curve can be done in different ways, a 
direct method being (Anoop, 2007):  
y
2
=x
3
+ax+b where 4a
3
+27b
2≠0 
If the „a‟ and „b‟ values are changed, various elliptic curves result. Since a 
fundamental operation of ECC is multiplying points, to calculate the public key in elliptic 
curve cryptography, the private key is multiplied by the curve‘s generator point „G‟, where 
the private key is a random number in the interval [1, n-1], and „n‟ is the curve‘s order 
(Anoop, 2007).  
Depending on how complex and difficult the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is, 
ECC is accordingly secure. If „P‟ and „Q‟ are points on the curve, then kP=Q; where a 
scalar „k‟ is multiplied by a point „P‟ to get another point, „Q‟ on the curve            
(Modares, 2009). 
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 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
Symmetric-key cryptosystems are faster than public-key, and are normally used for 
encryption and decryption. They require the entities‘ mutual agreement (i.e. Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange) on a secret key prior to beginning cryptography. The Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key exchange method is illustrated as follows (Huang, 2007).  
Figure A.4 shows Alice and Bob and two parties who are communicating and agree 
on an elliptic curve „E‟ over finite field Fq as well as on a point P𝜖E(Fq). Alice chooses a 
secret integer ‗𝑘‘, computes A=𝑔𝑘  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 and sends it to Bob. Bob does the same, chooses 
a secret integer𝑙, computes 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑙  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, and sends it to Alice. She computes           
 𝐾𝑎𝑏 = 𝐵
𝑘  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. On his end, Bob computes 𝐾𝑎𝑏 = 𝐴
𝑙  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. Finally, the result is the 
same for both parts (Kab=Kba) (Modares, 2009).  
 
Figure A.4: Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDH) 
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 Digital Signatures 
Digital Signature Algorithms (DSAs) help authenticate electronic messages or 
applications. Signatures have individual properties that only one single individual with a 
private key can come up with. However, anybody getting the message can validate a 
signature. For instance, if a sender, A, sends a message to a receiver, B, the message should 
be signed by A with a private key for message authentication, and A‘s public key can verify 
the signature. As such, if B knows A‘s public key, B can verify the signature             
(Huang, 2007).  
 A variation of DSA is Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) which 
works on elliptic curves. In DSA, if user A sends B a signed message, both A and B must 
agree on EC domain parameters. A possesses a private key „dA‟ and a public key              
QA = dA * G, where „dA‟ is a random number less than „n‟ („n‟ is the curve order) and „G‟ 
is the generator point (Huang, 2007).  
 
 ECDSA Key Generation 
ECDSA first performs key generation as:  
1. An elliptic curve „E‟ defined over GF(2𝑚 ) is chosen. The number of points on 
‗E‘ should be divisible by a large prime number „n‟.  
2. A point P = (x,y) ∈ GF(2𝑚 ) of order ‗n‘ is selected.  
3. A random integer ‗d‘ in interval [1, n-1] is chosen, and acts as the private key.  
4. Q=dP is calculated.  
             5. The public key is (E, P, n, Q).  
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 ECDSA signature Generation 
The sender signs a message, m, as:  
1. A random integer number k in the range [1, n-1] is calculated.  
2. Compute (x1, y1) = kP = k(x,y), and set r = x1 mod n. If „r‟ equals to zero, then go 
back to step 1. This means the private key is r=0, and ‗d‘ is not part of the signing equation 
[𝑠 = 𝑘−1 𝑕 𝑚 + 𝑑𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛].  
3. Calculate k-1mod n.  
4. Then compute𝑠 𝑆 = 𝑘−1 𝑕 𝑚 + 𝑑𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛, where h(m) is the hash value 
obtained from a suitable hash algorithm (i.e. Secure Hash Algorithm, SHA-1).  
The protocol remains secure so long as the private key stays secret. If the key gets lost or 
altered, it could be denied.  Stamps or perhaps some central tracking could help prevent this 
(Modares  et al., 2010). 
 
 Hash Function 
 Hash is a function that can be easily calculated from the set of all finite binary 
strings, {0, 1}
*
 to a fixed length binary string set, {0, 1}
n
. Hash functions are well known in 
digital signature systems (Debaert & Gilbert, 2002; Goldwasser, Micali, & Rivest, 1988), 
public key encryption schemes (Shoup, 2000), message authentication codes       
(Krawczyk, Canetti, & Bellare, 1997), etc. Collision or image resistant hash functions are 
used to create such systems. Naturally, a collision resistant hash function is a hash function, 
H(.), in which two different inputs (collision pair) are difficult to find (X ≠Y), so             
H(X) = H(Y). If an image resistant hash function receives a random image, it inverts it so it 
is not easy to find (Nandi, 2005).   
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 So far, 14 hash algorithm kinds are in use (Wang et al., 2005). It is argued that LM 
cryptographic functions (LanManager), MD5, SHA-0/SHA-1, and SHA-2. SHA-0 and 
SHA-1 are very similar and often taken as a single algorithm. 
 Finite Fields 
 All elliptic curve operations mentioned earlier are based on real numbers. However, 
operations over the real numbers are inaccurate and slow, whereas cryptographic operations 
need to be accurate and fast. Therefore, the curve cryptography can be defined over finite 
fields to operate EC efficiently and accurately. A finite field is a set of a finite number of 
elements. Figure A.5 describes elliptic curve operation hierarchy. It consists of 
cryptographic protocols, Elliptic Curve point operations and basic Galois Field operations. 
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Figure A.5: Hierarchy of Elliptic Curve Operations 
 
ECC hierarchy consists of three levels. The highest level is cryptography protocols. 
ECDH and ECDSA are two categories of cryptography protocol that are used to provide 
services like Public-key, signature and key agreement.  Elliptic Curve point operation level 
consists of Scalar Multiplication, which utilizes point adding and point doubling. In the last 
level, the operations are GF addition, GF multiplication, GF squaring and GF inversion.  
The rest of this part explains EC operations on finite fields. The operations are 
defined on affine coordinate system. Affine coordinate system is a normal coordinate 
system that represents each point by the vector (x, y). 
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 EC on Prime field 𝐅𝐩 
 The equation to retrieve all the possible points on the curve over the prime field is 
𝑦2𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 =  𝑥3  +  𝑎𝑥2  +  𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝, where 4a3 + 27b2 mod p ≠ 0. The elements of the 
finite field are integers between 0 and p – 1 thus all the operations such as addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division include integers between 0 and p – 1. The prime 
number „p‟ is the finitely large number of points on the EC in order to make the 
cryptosystem secure (Tata, 2007).  
 
 Point Addition 
 Let „J‟ and „K‟ be the two points on the curve where J = (xJ, yJ) and K = (xK, yK) 
and L=K+J where L=(xL,yL) and „s‟ is the incline of the line through „J‟ and „K‟ then: 
S = (yJ – yK)/(xJ – xK) mod p,  
xL = s
2
 - xJ – xK mod p  
yL = -yJ + s (xJ – xL) mod p 
So if K=-J for example K = (xJ, -yJ mod p) then J+K=O, where „O‟ is the point at 
infinity. If K=J, then J+K=2J needs to use point doubling equation too J + K = K + J. 
 
 Point Subtraction 
If „J‟ and „K‟ are two points on the curve where  J = (xJ, yJ) and K = (xK, yK) Then: 
J - K = J + (-K) where -K = (xk, -yk mod p) 
145 
 
In certain implementation of point multiplication such as NAF, point subtraction is used 
(Riedel, 2003; Stoneburner, 2001b). 
 
 Point Doubling 
Assume J=(xJ, yJ) and yJ ≠ 0 so the calculation of L= 2J where L = (xL, yL) is: 
s = (3xJ
2 
+ a) / (2yJ)mod p („S‟ is the tangent at point „J‟ and „a‟ is one of the parameters 
selected with the EC) 
xL = s
2
 – 2xJ mod p 
yL = -yJ + s(xJ – xL) mod p 
And „𝒪‟ is the point at infinity if yJ=0 then 2J= 𝒪.  
 
 Elliptic Curve (EC) on Binary field 𝐅𝟐𝐦 
 The equation to retrieve all the possible points on the curve over the binary field is 
𝐹2𝑚 is y
2
 + xy = x
3
 + ax
2
 + b, where b ≠ 0. The elements of the finite field are integers of 
length at most „m‟ bits, which they can be considered as a binary polynomial of degree   m 
– 1. On the other hand, in binary polynomial the coefficients can only be 0 or 1. Thus, all 
the operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division include 
polynomials of degree m – 1 or lesser. The m is the finitely large number of points on the 
EC to make the cryptosystem secure (Tata, 2007).  
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 Point Addition 
 „J‟ and „K‟ are two points on the curve which J = (xJ, yJ) and K = (xK, yK) and 
L=K+J where L= (xL,yL) and is the incline of the line through „J‟ and „K‟ then: 
s = (yJ + yK)/(xJ + xK) 
xL = s
2
 + s + xJ + xK + a 
yL = s (xJ + xL) + xL + yJ 
So if K=-J for example K = (xJ, xJ+yJ) then J+K= 𝒪, where „𝒪‟ is the point at 
infinity. And if K=J then J+K=2J. It needs to use point doubling equation also J + K = K 
+ J. 
 
 Point Subtraction 
If „J‟ and „K‟ are two points on the curve where J = (xJ, yJ) and K = (xK, yK) Then: 
J - K = J + (-K) where -K = (xk, xk+yk) 
In certain implementation of point multiplication such as NAF, point subtraction is 
used (Riedel, 2003; Stoneburner, 2001b). 
 
 Point Doubling 
Assume J=(xJ, yJ) and yJ ≠ 0 so calculating L= 2J where L = (xL, yL) is: 
s = xJ + yJ/ xJ, („S‟ is the tangent at point „J‟) 
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xL = s
2
 + s + a („a‟ is one of the parameters selected with the EC) 
yL = xJ
 2
 + (s + 1)*xL 
And „𝒪‟ is the point at infinity if xj=0 then 2J= 𝒪. 
 
Elliptic Curve Domain parameters 
 Domain parameters for EC over field Fp 
Elliptic curve over Fp has a list of domain parameters which includes ‗p‟, „a‟,‟ b‟,‟ G‟, „n‟ 
and ‗h‟parameters. 
„a‟ and „b‟: define the curve y2 mod p= x3 + ax + b mod p. 
„p‟: prime number defined for finite field Fp  
„G‟: generator point (XG,YG) on the EC that is selected for cryptography operations. 
„n‟: The Elliptic curve order. 
„h‟: if #E(Fp) is the number of points on an elliptic curve, then „h‟ is co-factor where 
h=#E(Fp)/n. 
 
 Domain parameters for EC binary fields 
Elliptic curve over 𝐹2𝑚  has a list of domain parameters which include „m‟, f(x), „a‟, 
„b‟, „G‟, „n‟ and „h‟ parameters. 
„m‟: an integer to finite field F2 
m
. 
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F(x): the irreducible polynomial of degree m that is used for elliptic curve operations. 
„a‟ and „b‟: define the curves y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. 
„G‟: the generator point (xG, yG) on the EC that is selected for cryptography operations. 
„n‟: the order of the elliptic curve. 
„h‟: if #E(𝐹2𝑚 ) is the number of points on an elliptic curve then „h‟ is cofactor where 
h=#E(𝐹2𝑚 )/n. 
 
 Field Arithmetic 
 Modular arithmetic and polynomial arithmetic are two different types applied in 
ECC operations depending on the chosen field. In Modular arithmetic, over a number „p‟ 
arithmetic covers the number in the interval [0 and p – 1]. Modular Arithmetic contains 
Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, Division, Multiplicative Inverse and Finding x mod y 
operations. Polynomial Arithmetic contains Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, Division, 
Multiplicative Inverse and Irreducible Polynomial (Tata, 2007). Polynomial arithmetic 
plays an important role in a number of areas of engineering and software verification. In 
particular, polynomial limitation solving has a long and successful history in the 
developing tools to provide termination of programs (Borralleras, Lucas, Navarro-Marset, 
Carbonell, & Rubio, 2009). This research is based on polynomial arithmetic. Therefore, 
this part gives an overview of polynomial arithmetic. 
 EC over field 𝐹2𝑚 includes arithmetic of integer with length m bits. The binary 
string can be declared as polynomial: 
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Binary String: (am-1 ... a1 a0) 
Polynomial: am-1x
m-1
 + am-2x
m-2
 + ... + a2x
2
 + a1x + a0 where ai = 0. 
For example: x
3
 + x
2
 + 1 is polynomial for a four-bit number 11012. 
 
 Addition 
If A = x
3
 + x
2
 + 1 and B = x
2
 + x are two polynomial then A+B called polynomial 
addition that returns x
3
 + 2x
2
 + x + 1 after taking mod 2 over coefficients                                
A + B = x
3
 + x + 1. 
On binary representation, polynomial addition can be achieved by simple XOR of two 
numbers. For example, over GF(24) there are 16 elements where f x = x4 + x + 1 as 
follows: 
0 (0000) 1 (0001) 𝑥(0010) 
𝑥 + 1(0011)  𝑥2(0100)  𝑥2 + 1(0101)  
𝑥2 + 𝑥(0110) 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 1(0111) 𝑥3(0100) 
𝑥3 + 1 (1001) 𝑥3 + 𝑥 (1010) 𝑥3 + 𝑥 + 1 (1011) 
𝑥3 + 𝑥2(1100) 𝑥3 + 𝑥2 + 1(1101) 𝑥3 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥 (1110) 
𝑥3 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 1 (1111)   
So if:     A = 11012  
             B = 01102 
 
A+B=A XOR B  A+B=10112 
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 Subtraction 
If A = x
3
 + x
2
 + 1 and B = x
2
 + x are two polynomials, then A-B is called 
polynomial subtraction that returns x
3
 - x + 1 after taking mod 2 over coefficients                 
A - B = x
3
 + x + 1. 
On binary representation, polynomial addition can be achieved by a simple XOR of two 
numbers same as the Addition operation in 𝐹2𝑚 : 
A = 11012  
B = 01102 
 
 Multiplication 
If A = x
3
 + x
2
 + 1 and B = x
2
 + x are two polynomials, then A*B is called 
polynomial multiplication that returns x
5
+x
3
 + x
2
 + x, m=4. The result should be reduced to 
a degree less than 4 by irreducible polynomial x
4
 + x + 1. 
x
5
 + x
3
 + x
2
 + x (mod f(x)) = (x
4
 + x + 1)x + x
5
 + x
3
 + x
2
 + x  
                                 = 2x
5
 + x
3
 + 2x
2
 + 2x = x3 (after reducing the coefficient on mod 2) 
A = 11012 
B = 01102 
A * B = 10002 
 
 
A-B=A XOR B  A+B=10112 
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 Division 
a * b
-1
 (mod f(x)) has the same result of a/b(mod f(x)). So in order to find a/b(mod 
f(x)),a * b
-1
 (mod f(x)) can be used. Instead of this, b
-1
 is the multiplicative inverse of „b‟. 
 
 Multiplicative Inversion 
There are 16 powers for 𝑔 where the element 𝑔 = (0010) is a generator: 
𝑔0 = (0001) 𝑔1= (0010) 𝑔2 = (0100) 𝑔3 = (1000) 
𝑔4 = (0011) 𝑔5 = (0110) 𝑔6 = (1100) 𝑔7 = (1011) 
𝑔8 = (0101) 𝑔9 = (1010) 𝑔10  = (0111) 𝑔11  = (1110) 
𝑔12  = (1111) 𝑔13  = (1101) 𝑔14= (1001) 𝑔15  = (0001). 
The multiplicative identity is 𝑔0 = (0001) and the multiplicative inverse for 
𝑔9 =  1010 is: 
𝑔9= (1010) is 𝑔−9mod 15 = 𝑔6 mod 15 
To assure that 𝑔6is the multiplicative inverse of 𝑔9 their multiplication result should 
be 1.  
Proofing that𝑔6 × 𝑔9 ≡ 1 mod 𝑓(𝑥) 
𝑔6 ∙ 𝑔9 = (1010) ∙ (1100)  
(𝑥3 + x) ∙ (x3 + x2) mod f(x) 
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(x6 + x5 + x4 + x3) mod f(x)=1 (which is the multiplicative identity) 
This means 𝑔−9 ≡ 𝑔6mod f(x) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 Analysis of Security Services and Architectures for Binding Updates 
In order to minimise and address the security risks and attacks discussed above, the 
following security services should be provided (Modares, 2009; Riedel, 2003; Stoneburner, 
2001a) : 
 
 Authentication Mechanisms and Architecture  in Mobile IP 
The aim of encryption is to keep data private in case it gets intercepted. To 
authenticate and verify system users, various techniques exist to ensure that the data 
received is intact and real.  
 Security protocols normally use some methods of authentication, and followed by a 
protected data exchange. Sometimes, the states are closely integrated like in TLS 
(Transport Layer Security), or at other times, the states can be separate and belong to 
different endpoints, like in EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) and Kerberos 
(Eronen & Arkko, 2006).  
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used in decentralized authentication, and does 
not need an on-line authentication server. Current PKIs require a centralized server because 
they do not do well with authorization. Authentication and authorization data are often 
integrated into an authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) server (Arkko, 
Calhoun, Guttman, Nelson, & Wolff, 2000; Modares et al., 2010). 
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 Key Exchange Protocols 
 Kerberos 
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol (Kohl & Neuman, 1993; TUNG, 
2005) that uses secret-key cryptography in order to provide strong authentication for 
client/server applications. It is based on the key distribution model developed by Needham 
and Schroeder (Needham & Schroeder, 1978) who wanted to eliminate the need to present 
private or secret information (a password) by exposing information.  Kerberos fundamental 
architecture is the KDC (Key Distribution Centre) which is responsible for storing the 
authentication data and uses it to securely authenticate users and services. 
Secure authentication means: 
• Does not occur in plaintext; 
• Does not rely on authentication by the host operating system; 
• Does not trust IP addresses; and 
• Does not require network host physical security. 
The KDC is basically a third-party which carries out authentication services, with 
many, vital functions, where each KDC stores a database of users, servers, and secret keys. 
Kerberos clients are normal network applications, adapted to authentication. 
Total security is crucial since KDCs contain secret keys for every network user and 
server. For instance, if an attacker impersonates an authenticated system user, he would 
gain administrative access to the KDC with all its Kerberos resources.  
To encrypt Kerberos, Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is used, and 
adding encryption or check sum algorithms are available. Kerberos also supports the Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC-32), Message-Digest Algorithm (MD4, MD5), and the DES 
algorithms for checksums.  
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 AAA - Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
On the Internet, a client belonging to one administrative domain (home domain) 
usually has to utilize resources from a different administrative domain (foreign domain). In 
dealing with a client, a foreign domain agent (attendant) probably needs the client‘s 
certification for authentication prior to granting resource access (Arkko et al., 2000). 
Certification should be understood by the foreign domain; however, credentials are mostly 
allocated and understood only by the home domain, to help create secure channels to the 
MN. 
The AAA protocols (Metz, 1999) were first created for dial-up users with secure 
access to an ISP. AAA defines a framework for coordinating individual security and 
network elements like user authentication, authorization to access services, and service 
accounting for billing over many network technologies and platforms. The AAA protocol 
offers distributed services by communicating with an AAA client. Before yielding network 
access, the AAA server uses its user database for authenticating and validating end-users 
who must provide unique identification like a password, a cryptographic key or biometric 
data to be compared against the information in the database. Thus, when data match, the 
user is granted network access, if it does not, access is denied. 
After authorization, the server defines the services a user may access, including providing 
an IP address, and allowing access to, or supporting certain applications. Accounting 
supervises network use and gathers data regarding resource usage to help with billing and 
auditing. 
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